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Health care market has often been regulated by government legislation.  A California law 
passed in 1999 regulating minimum nurse to patient ratios in hospital units is one of them.  
This legislation was prompted by results from previous research showing higher adverse 
patient outcomes when hospital nurse/patient ratios are low.   In the second chapter of my 
dissertation, I use a census of hospital discharges in California during 1996-2000 to estimate 
the impact of hospital staff levels on adverse events by examining whether outcomes are 
correlated with the number of admissions in the hospital over the next two days.  I find 
quantitatively small and statistically insignificant effects of Friday and Saturday admission 
shocks on mortality rates of patients admitted on Thursdays.   These results suggest that the 
portion of the California law designed to guarantee adequate staffing when the patient census 
increases unexpectedly should have little impact on patient outcomes. 
Another regulation which has been proposed by the government is federal tort reform.  One 
frequent justification for tort reform proposals is the potential impact of liability on defensive 
medicine.  There is however, scant and conflicting evidence on whether malpractice risk 
alters physician practices.  In the third chapter of my dissertation, I examine whether 
malpractice risk alters the procedure choices of obstetricians, who face one of the highest 
  
rates of malpractice lawsuits and pay much larger malpractice premiums than most other 
specialties.  By focusing on obstetricians, I can observe the impact of malpractice risk on the 
use of procedures such as cesarean sections, vaginal births after cesareans, prenatal care 
visits, the use of diagnostic tests such as ultrasound and amniocentesis, and the use of various 
equipment and techniques during the delivery such as fetal monitoring, forceps and vacuum 
extraction.  Because the measured malpractice risk may signal something unobserved about 
physician quality or practice style, I use malpractice claims against non-OB/GYNs as an 
instrument for OB/GYN claims.  I find that cesarean section rates and most other measures of 
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Chapter 1: Overview 
In 2002, Health care spending in US reached $1.5 trillion which was 14.9 percent of 
GDP (The World Health Report, 2005) and it is expected to rise more in the future.  
Government expenditure comprises 45 percent of total medical expenditure.   
The medical care industry and efficacy with which it satisfies the needs of society 
differ from a competitive model (Arrow, 1963).  Private and public medical insurance 
shields people from true cost of health care and might induce moral hazard.  Healthcare 
market is far from perfectly competitive.  As a result, governments intervene in the 
market frequently to ensure the proper function of the market.  For example, to control 
the quality of the medical services provided the government regulates many things 
including doctors' license. 
There are growing concerns of a causal relationship between nurse to patient ratio and 
patient outcomes.  This becomes a bigger concern when the whole nation is experiencing 
a nurse shortage.  Currently, there are 126,000 vacant nursing positions in U.S. hospitals.1  
There are 20 percent vacancy rates for nursing positions in California and 16 percent in 
Florida.2  Nationwide, the number of employed registered nurses per 100,000 people has 
declined by 2 percent between 1996 and 2000, a time period when total heath care costs 
increased 26 percent.3 California adopted the "Minimum Staffing Ratio" law based on 
growing evidence of a causal relationship between nurse staffing and patient outcomes.  
It will cost the California governments at least an extra $40 million per year to implement 
                                                 
1 TrendWatch,  American Hospital Association,  June 2001. 
2 Government Accounting Office, “Nursing Workforce: Emerging Nurse Shortages Due to Multiple 
Factors” (GAO-01-944),  July 2001. 
3 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary: National Health Statistics Group. 
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the new law.  Due to the expected costs and controversy surrounding the legislation, it 
took five years to determine the specifics of the law before the regulations went into 
effect.  The legislated minimum nurse/patient ratios range from one-to-one in operating 
rooms to one-to-eight in a well-baby nursery.  The law also requires that the minimum 
staffing levels must be maintained at all times, without exception, except for extreme 
events such as earthquakes.   
Although the bulk of the evidence suggests that lower nursing staff ratios in 
hospitals lead to higher rates of adverse events, the studies that prompted the California 
law may not have measured the causal impact of staff size on outcomes.  Many previous 
studies compare outcomes and staff level across hospitals.  The estimates in these studies 
are likely to suffer from an omitted variable bias.  Hospitals differ along many 
dimensions and a hospital with higher staff levels may have other hard-to-measure 
characteristics, such as better surgeons, newer technology and more diagnostic 
equipment, that may help explain why these hospitals have higher quality of care.  
Similarly, studies that use within-hospital variation such as those studies that compare 
patients admitted to hospitals on weekend versus during the workweek may suffer from a 
selection bias.  Many patients admitted during the week are scheduled admissions with 
less severe conditions.  In contrast, patients admitted during the weekend tend to be more 
acute cases.   
In the second chapter of the dissertation, I will use unexpected shocks to 
admissions as an exogenous source of variation in effective staff levels.  When a patient 
is admitted to a hospital on a particular day, the effective staff level (e.g., the staff per 
patient ratio) the patient experiences will be determined by the number of admissions and 
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discharges during his/her stay.  If a patient in a particular hospital admitted on a Thursday 
faces an abnormally high number of admissions during his/her hospitalization starting the 
next day, then the effective staffing ratio will be lower for those Thursday admissions.  
The number of admissions over the next few days is highly variable and provides little if 
any information about patients already in the hospital.  Therefore, I compare the 
outcomes of patients admitted to the same hospital but on different Thursdays and see 
whether outcomes are correlated with higher unexpected admission on the following 
Friday and Saturday.  I focus on the outcomes of Thursday admissions for two reasons.  
First, hospital staffs are much smaller on the weekend so hospitals are potentially more 
vulnerable to admission shocks during this period.  Second, according to our index of 
daily admissions, admissions during Friday and Saturday demonstrate more fluctuation 
than on weekdays, providing necessary variation to identify the model. 
Although there are large unexpected shocks to admissions in a census of hospital 
discharges in California over the 1996-2000 period, I find only limited evidence that these 
swings in caseload adversely impact patients.   In some samples, we find that large 
shocks to Friday/Saturday admissions reduce length of stay and increase readmission 
probabilities for patients admitted on Thursdays.  However, these coefficients are very 
small.  Most other outcomes such as in-hospital mortality and 7- and 14-days patient 
mortality are not impacted by the unexpected shocks.   
Hardly a week goes by without a front page news article on rising health care costs 
(Newhouse, 1992).  Even though health care cost increases faster than inflation, no one 
has come up with a credible answer for why it is rising this fast.  One possible scenario is 
the over-use of medical care due to some factors like increased malpractice suits.  In the 
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U.S., malpractice insurance premiums increased rapidly in the 1970's and 1980's and 
again in the early part of this decade.  These recent hikes have led the American Medical 
Association to declare a 'malpractice premium crisis' in 20 states, including Florida, 
Pennsylvania and New York.4  Nationwide, malpractice insurance premiums increased 15 
percent between 2000 and 2002.5  During the same time period, specialists in some areas 
experienced premium increases of more than 100 percent.6   
In response to these premium hikes, many researchers and policy makers have 
attempted to pass federal tort reform bill to lower malpractice risk that doctors face.  
Reform sponsors also argue that greater malpractice risk adversely affects the 
delivery of health care in two ways.  First, an increase in risk may discourage doctors 
from treating people with certain conditions or from conducting risky (but potentially 
beneficial) procedures.  Second, healthcare utilization may increase as doctors alter their 
practice patterns.  To avoid a lawsuit or increase the chance of winning a malpractice 
suit, a doctor may perform procedures that have little or no medical benefit to the 
patients, but that protect him from possible future litigation.  Opponents of reform bills 
believe that limiting compensation for the injured can be unfair to the people who have 
already suffered significantly from medical malpractice.   
At the center of this controversy is the question whether doctors are changing their 
practice patterns and procedure choices based on malpractice risk that they face.  To date, 
there is little hard evidence on this point.   
                                                 
4 http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11871.html 
5 Based on the author's calculation using Medical Liability Monitor annual premium survey.  No weights 
were used. 
6 Malpractice premium increased 115 percent for OB/GYNs in Oregon and 110 percent for general 
surgeons in Mississippi. 
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I focus on obstetric care since obstetric care is the practice area that is thought to be 
particularly affected by high malpractice risk.  It is often suggested that malpractice 
concerns encourage OB/GYNs to perform more cesarean sections (c-sections) than 
medically needed.  For example, the birth of a neurologically-impaired infant, the most 
prevalent reason for a lawsuit in the OB/GYN specialty, can occur before or during 
deliveries (ACOG survey, 2003).  However, in deliveries involving a birth injury, doctors 
are more likely to be suspected as negligent when the baby is delivered vaginally due to 
the limited control of progress compared to cesarean section (Sachs, 1989).  Therefore, 
some have suggested that plaintiffs can more easily argue doctors' negligence, such as the 
lack of a timely response for more invasive procedures, when a baby is delivered 
vaginally.  Others have argued that the rapid increase of the U.S. c-section rate in the 
1980's relative to England (which showed a similar c-section rate to the U.S. in the 
1970's) is attributable to the difference in legal environments.  There is also more than a 
10 percentage point difference in c-section rates between some states, with some of this 
potentially explained by differences in legal environments.7 
In my empirical analysis, I measure the malpractice risk that doctors face using 
the National Practitioner Data Bank.  This data set is a national universe of resolved 
malpractice claims either by settlement or jury verdicts for the 15 year period from 1990 
to 2005.  This long time period allows me to exploit the considerable variation both 
between states and within a state over time in malpractice risk at the extensive (number 
of cases) and intensive (awards per case) margins.  I calculate malpractice risk in two 
ways: as either the number of OB/GYN claims per 1,000 births in each state over the last 
                                                 
7 In 2003, the c-section rate in Florida was 30.8 percent compared to 19.2 percent in Utah based on 
National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2005. 
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three years, or the amount of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in $1,000s in each state over 
the last three years.8  I will combine these malpractice measures with a census of birth in 
US which has delivery method information as well as various measures of prenatal care. 
One challenge for reliable identification is that malpractice risk as defined above 
may be correlated with other factors related to the treatment decision, such as unobserved 
patient characteristics, physician quality or practice style.  For example, if doctors 
respond to malpractice risk by performing more c-sections, this may decrease the 
malpractice risk since c-section lowers the probability of a lawsuit compared to vaginal 
delivery (reverse causality).  To address this issue, I use an instrumental variables (IV) 
identification strategy that will capture only the malpractice risk generated by a state’s 
legal environment.  In particular, I use the malpractice risk in non-OB/GYN specialties as 
an instrument for the OB/GYN risk measure.    
My findings demonstrate that cesarean section rates are not responsive to medical 
malpractice risk.  Additionally, access to health care, measured by the number of prenatal 
visits during pregnancy, is also insignificantly related to malpractice risk.  I also find that 
malpractice risk has no statistical or qualitatively important impact on the use of other 
procedures such as ultrasound, fetal monitoring, forceps, or vacuum.    
 
                                                 
8 I use three years for the following two reasons.  Average litigation process takes three to four years and 
malpractice risk is a noisy measure, since the incidence rate is low. 
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Chapter 2: Patients Outcomes When Hospitals Experience a Surge 
in Admissions 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
In 1999, California’s Governor Gray Davis signed into law AB 394 which 
requires hospitals to maintain specific ratios of nurse to patients.  In January of 2004, 
after years of hearings to determine the specifics of the law, the regulations went into 
effect.  The legislated minimum nurse/patient ratios range from one to one in operating 
rooms to one to eight in a well-baby nursery.  The law also requires that the minimum 
staffing levels must be maintained at all times, without exception.  The law does not even 
allow deviations from legislated limits during short time breaks for necessary needs.   
The California law was motivated by a growing number of studies documenting 
higher adverse events in hospitals with lower nurse/patient ratios.   For example, a 1999 
report by the Institute for Health and Socio-economic Policy examined four years worth 
of hospital discharge data from California and found that over the time period analyzed, 
inpatient outcomes were declining and so were hospital staff levels. Studies by Aiken et 
al. (2002) and Provonost et al. (1999) found higher adverse event rates in hospitals with 
lower staffing ratios.  Finally, Bell and Redelmeier (2001) found higher mortality rates 
among patients admitted over the weekend, a period when hospital staffs are typically 
lower, compared to admissions during the week, when the hospital staff levels are 
greatest. 
The call for higher nurse/patient ratios is coming at a time when some hospitals 
are having a difficult time filling positions.  A number of medical groups have 
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documented a nursing shortage in the United States.  Currently, there are 126,000 vacant 
nursing positions in U.S. hospitals.9  Vacancy rates for nursing positions are 20 percent in 
California and 16 percent in Florida.10  Nationwide, the number of employed registered 
nurses per 100,000 people has declined by 2 percent between 1996 and 2000,2 a time 
period when total heath care costs increased 26 percent.11  Given the specifics of the 
California law and the current shortage of nurses, the costs of AB 394 are expected to be 
large.  Dobkin (2003) cited work that estimates a cost of at least $400 million per year to 
implement the California nurse/staffing rule. Nevertheless, many health care groups are 
looking closely at the consequences of the California law and other states are preparing 
similar statutes. 
Although the bulk of the evidence suggests that lower nursing staff ratios in 
hospitals lead to higher rates of adverse events, the studies that prompted the California 
law may not have measured the causal impact of staff size on outcomes.  As we 
document below, the bulk of the studies compare outcomes and staff level across 
hospitals.  The estimates in these studies are likely to suffer from an omitted variable 
bias.  Hospitals differ along many dimensions and a hospital with higher staff levels may 
have other hard-to-measure characteristics, such as better surgeons, newer technology 
and more diagnostic equipment, that may help explain why these hospitals have higher 
quality of care.  Similarly, studies that use within-hospital variation such as those studies 
that compare patients admitted to hospitals on weekend versus during the workweek may 
suffer from a selection bias.  Many patients admitted during the week are scheduled 
                                                 
9 TrendWatch,  American Hospital Association,  June 2001. 
10 Government Accounting Office, “Nursing Workforce: Emerging Nurse Shortages Due to Multiple 
Factors” (GAO-01-944),  July 2001. 
11 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary: National Health Statistics Group. 
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admissions with less severe conditions.  In contrast, patients admitted during the weekend 
tend to be more acute cases.   
In this chapter, we return to the original question that led to the California 
legislation and examine whether lower hospital staff levels cause adverse patient 
outcomes.  Specifically, we will use unexpected shocks to admissions as an exogenous 
source of variation in effective staff levels.  When a patient is admitted to a hospital on a 
particular day, the effective staff level (e.g., the staff per patient ratio) the patient 
experiences will be determined by the number of admissions and discharges during 
his/her stay.  If a patient in a particular hospital admitted on a Thursday faces an 
abnormally high number of admissions during his/her hospitalization starting the next 
day, then the effective staffing ratio will be lower for those Thursday admissions.  The 
number of admissions over the next few days is highly variable and provides little if any 
information about patients already in the hospital.  In this chapter, we compare the 
outcomes of patients admitted to the same hospital but on different Thursdays and see 
whether outcomes are correlated with higher unexpected admission on the following 
Friday and Saturday.  We focus on the outcomes of Thursday admissions for two reasons.  
First, hospital staffs are much smaller on the weekend so hospitals are potentially more 
vulnerable to admission shocks during this period.  Second, according to our index of 
daily admissions, admissions during Friday and Saturday demonstrate more fluctuation 
than on weekdays, providing necessary variation to identify the model. 
The data for this project come from restricted-use hospital discharge data in the 
state of California over the 1996 to 2000 period.  The data set contains a census of 
hospital discharges in the state over this period.  The restricted-use version of the data 
 
 10
contains the exact date of admission and discharge, and an encrypted Social Security 
Number allowing us to track patients over time and merge records with vital statistical 
data.  
Our identification strategy has a number of distinct advantages over those used in 
previous papers.  First, unlike previous cross-hospital studies, this chapter exploits the 
variation over time in admissions within a hospital, allowing us to control for permanent 
differences across hospitals in the quality of care.  Second, unlike studies that rely on 
within-hospital variation by the day of the week, we are not comparing admissions across 
different days of the week when patient acuity may be fundamentally different.  Third, 
our identification strategy mimics the exact situation the California minimum staffing law 
was designed to avoid, namely, large swings in patient case load.  Fourth, we use much 
larger samples than have been used in the past.   
Although there are large unexpected shocks to admissions, we find only limited 
evidence that these swings in caseload adversely impact patients.   In some samples, we 
find that large shocks to Friday/Saturday admissions reduce length of stay and increase 
readmission probabilities for patients admitted on Thursdays.  However, these 
coefficients are very small.  We find quantitatively small and statistically insignificant 
impacts of Friday/Saturday admission shocks on in-hospital mortality and 7- and 14-day 
patient mortality.  The shocks to admissions that we observe in the data are quite large.  
In five percent of the Thursdays in our sample, subsequent Friday/Saturday admissions 
are 40 percent over ‘predicted’ numbers, yet there is limited evidence that patient health 
suffered to any degree.  These results suggest that we should expect little impact on 
 
 11
patient outcomes from the portions of the California hospital staffing law designed to 
insure adequate staffing when patient census fluctuates.   
2.2 Recent Literature on the Impact of Hospital Staff Levels 
Previous research on the impact of nurse staffing ratios on adverse patient events 
can be classified into two types of studies:  cross-hospital studies and within-hospital 
comparisons.   In a typical cross-hospital study, researchers merged administrative data 
on hospital discharges with survey data on average hospital staff levels.  The researcher 
then compared outcomes across hospitals with high and low staff levels, controlling for a 
variety of factors.  For example, using discharge data from 168 hospitals, Aiken et al. 
(2002) found a higher probability of adverse outcomes, such as death within 30 days and 
failure to rescue, for hospitals with low registered nurse-to-patient ratios, after adjusting 
for a variety of patient and hospital characteristics.  They also observed a positive 
relationship between low registered nurse-to-patient hospitals and a registered nurses’ 
emotional exhaustion or job dissatisfaction.   
Using discharges from 799 hospitals, Needleman et al. (2002) found better patient 
outcomes, such as shorter length of stay or a lower probability of a urinary tract infection, 
when more nursing care was provided by registered nurses instead of licensed practical 
nurses or nurses aides. The nurse-to-patient ratio had a statistically significant impact on 
determining patient outcomes.  
Pronovost et al. (1999) examined outcomes for abdominal aortic surgery patients 
in 39 Intensive Care Units (ICU) in Maryland hospitals from 1994 to 1996. The authors 
found that daily rounds by an ICU physician were associated with reduced risk of in-
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hospital mortality after adjusting for patient characteristics, co-morbid disease,12 severity 
of illness, hospital and surgeon volume, and hospital characteristics.  Also, a lower 
nurse/staffing ratio and not having a full-time ICU medical director increased the ICU 
length of stay significantly.   
Although all of these cross-hospital studies suggest hospitals with more staff per 
patient have better patient outcomes, one can question whether these results represent a 
causal relationship.  Hospitals vary considerably in both the characteristics of their 
patients and in their facilities, and in many cases, these characteristics are correlated.  For 
example, it would not be surprising to find hospitals with higher nurse/patient levels to 
also have more advanced hospital technology.  Likewise, lower-staffed hospitals may 
serve a decidedly sicker clientele.  Therefore, these cross-hospital estimates are likely 
subject to omitted variable bias.13 
 The problems inherent in cross-hospital studies have been recognized by others.  
In response, researchers have suggested using within-hospital models as a way to address 
the omitted variables bias.  These studies use variation in hospital staffing levels at 
different points in time within the same hospital to identify the impact of staff levels.  
Having time-series variation in outcomes and staffing within a hospital allows the 
researchers to hold constant hospital-specific characteristics in their analysis.  For 
example, one group of studies uses the differences in staff levels on weekends versus 
weekdays to identify the consequences of different staffing levels.  In these studies, the 
                                                 
12 Disease existed on admission as a preexisting condition. 
13 The bias does not necessarily go in one direction.  Patient selection into hospitals may mean that the 
benefits of high hospital staff levels are understated.  Capps et al. (2001) found that patients with more 
severe cases are more willing to endure higher costs and longer travel to get treatment from hospitals with 
better reputations.  If hospitals with better reputations also have more staff per patient, then the selection of 
more severe patients into better hospitals will lower the observed performance of these hospitals and make 
it might look as if the higher staffing ratio does not matter for outcomes. 
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authors note that in most cases, acute care hospitals do not operate fully during the 
weekend.  This will result in lower staffing ratios on the weekend compared to weekdays.  
Bell and Redelmeier (2001), using an administrative hospital discharge data set from 
Ontario, Canada over the 1988 to 1997 period, found that patients admitted during the 
weekend experienced a higher mortality rate than patients admitted on a weekday, after 
adjusting for age, sex and coexisting disorders. In this work, the authors restricted their 
attention to acute care admissions for three diseases (ruptured abdominal aortic 
aneurysm, acute epiglottitis, and pulmonary embolism) that originated in the emergency 
room.  The three diseases were picked because they are more likely to show different 
outcomes as a result of differential care.  Patients admitted through the emergency room 
are more likely to have less variation in their severity of illness between weekdays and 
weekend since less urgent cases will not use the emergency room.  They found that 
weekend admissions were associated with significantly higher in-hospital mortality than 
weekday admissions for these three diseases. As a specification test, they picked three 
other diseases (myocardial infarction, intracerebral hemorrhage, and acute hip fracture) 
that are less impacted by staff-level variation. They did not find excessive mortality in 
any of the other three diseases for weekend admissions.  In addition, they observed that 
26 diseases among the 100 with the highest in-hospital mortality showed significantly 
higher odds ratio of in-hospital mortality and none of these top 100 diseases revealed a 
lower odds ratio.   It is also possible that the results in this study can be explained by 
differences in the quality of the staff that works on weekdays and weekends.   
Tarnow-Mordi et al. (2000) collected four years of information on admissions to 
the ICU from a hospital in Scotland.  They found a statistically significant higher 
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mortality rate when there is a high workload relative to the nursing staff in the ICU, even 
after adjusting for the severity of the illness using the patient’s Acute Physiology and 
Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) II score.14   
Although within-hospital studies should reduce some types of omitted variables 
bias, they are subject to selection bias from another source.  Hospitals may admit a 
different type of patient on the weekend compared to the weekday.  It is likely that given 
the lower staff levels on the weekend, hospitals may only admit patients with more severe 
conditions on the weekend.  Patients might also try to avoid going to the hospital during 
the weekend unless their illness is severe enough to endure the inconvenience of a 
weekend emergency room visit.  As a result, there is the possibility that high adverse 
outcomes among patients admitted during the weekend could be the result of differential 
severity and not because of differential staffing.     
Dobkin (2003), using the same weekly staffing variation used by Bell and 
Redelmeier (2001), found no statistically significant relationship between the day of 
admission and in-hospital mortality using California hospital discharge data from 1995 to 
1999.   Dobkin used two methods to control for the different acuity of patients admitted 
during the weekday and weekend.  First, Dobkin used only a subsample of patients who 
were admitted through the emergency room, which are all unplanned visits.  Second, 
Dobkin added a variable to the regression that measures the difference between the actual 
number of admissions on the day of the week by disease and an evenly distributed 
number of admissions throughout the week.  Dobkin argues that a similar number of 
patients should be admitted regardless of the day of the week for each illness if there is 
                                                 
14 The APACHE II score is derived from a research of ICU admissions on 13 US hospitals between 1979 
and 1982 to predict a patient's risk of death using routine information.  It is the most widely used method of 
assessing the severity of illness in patients in intensive care units. 
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no selection by severity.  Once this variable is added to the model, the higher mortality 
rate for patients admitted during the weekend disappears.   The question we address is 
conceptually similar to that posed by Dobkin, but our identification strategy is different.  
Dobkin compares patients admitted on weekdays (when staffs are high) and the weekend 
(when staffs are low).  In contrast, we hold fixed the day of admission and compare 
outcomes when the next two day’s admissions are high (and effective staff levels are low) 
and low (and effective staff levels are high).  
 
2.3 Empirical Methodology 
2.3.1 A Proxy for effective staff levels 
Although there are many patient-level data sets that provide detailed information 
about hospital discharges, there are no large-scale data sets that identify hospital staff 
levels on a particular day.  As a result, there is no published research correlating patient 
outcomes with actual daily staff levels.  Researchers can only infer hospital staff levels 
from other variables such as Bell and Redelmeier’s (2001) use of weekend versus 
weekday admissions.  In contrast, most cross-hospital studies have some measure of 
hospital staff levels but the variable is averaged over many months of service.   
In this chapter we use plausibly exogenous variation in ‘effective’ staff levels to 
identify the impact of staffing on outcomes.  Daily hospital staff levels are determined 
some weeks in advance using the hospital’s expectations about admissions to plan for 
staff needs.  Given these fixed work schedules, the expected nurse/patient ratio is subject 
to variation based on unexpected surges in patient admissions.   As we demonstrate 
below, the number of admissions does vary considerably from day to day, and this 
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variation will generate unexpected shocks to the effective hospital staffing level.  
Consider a patient admitted to a hospital on a Thursday.  Over the next few days, the 
effective staff level for that patient will fall if an unexpectedly large number of patients 
are admitted to the hospital. 
To measure the effective staff level faced by a patient, we will use admissions 
during the next two days as a proxy for effective nurse staffing levels.  We decided not to 
use admissions on a patient’s day of admission because this may create a selected sample 
– if admissions on a Thursday are running above average, hospitals may be less likely to 
admit less-severe cases, making the remaining admissions a selected sample.  The next 
two days’ admissions are by definition exogenous to the patient admitted today.  The 
window that we observe is however open to debate.  We choose two days for a couple of 
reasons.  First, the majority of patients are only in the hospital for two to three days.  If 
we considered a longer period of admission than two days, we could include unrelated 
staffing variation.  On the other hand, we would be throwing out useful variation by 
restricting attention to only the next day's admissions.   
As we noted earlier, we choose to focus on the outcomes of patients admitted to 
hospitals on Thursdays because hospitals tend to have much smaller staffs on the 
weekend and hospital admissions are more volatile on Friday and Saturday compared to 
other days.  The difference in work schedules for hospital nurses based on the day of the 
week is reflected in Table 2-1.  In that table, we report results from the Work Schedule 
Supplements to the Current Population Surveys (CPS).   The CPS is a monthly survey of 
60,000 households and their members.  The survey results provide basic labor market 
data such as the monthly unemployment rates for the nation.  Supplements to the basic 
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monthly survey are sometimes administered and the two most recent Work Schedule 
Supplements were fielded in May of 1997 and May of 2001.  In 1997 workers were asked 
whether they worked on particular days of the week, and in the 2001 supplement, they 
were asked what days of the week they usually work.  We use the detailed industry and 
occupation codes to produce a subsample of registered nurses and nurse aides who work 
in hospitals.  In the May 1997 survey, the fraction of nurses or nurse aides working 
during the weekend is one half the fraction working during the week.  The fraction drops 
considerably in the May 2001 survey, most likely due to the slight but important change 
in the question between the two surveys.  In any event, substantially fewer nurses and 
nurse aides work during the weekend than during the week.   In the 1997 CPS data, there 
were 52 percent fewer registered nurses working on Saturday compared to Wednesday.  
This number increased to 81 percent in the 2001 CPS.  In the final column of the table, 
we report the distribution of hospital admissions by the day of the week in 1997 and 
2000.  Note that the drop in admissions on the weekend is not as large as the drop in staff 
levels.  In both 1997 and 2000, there was a drop of 42 and 41 percent respectively, in the 
number of admissions between Wednesday and Saturday.   
As we discuss below, the primary data for this analysis are a census of hospital 
discharges in the state of California over the 1996-2000 period.  To illustrate the 
volatility of admissions on the weekend versus weekdays, we constructed hospital-
specific counts of daily admissions for each of the nearly 400 California hospitals in our 
sample.  We then construct a daily eight-week moving average of admission counts, so 
for Tuesdays, we use the previous eight Tuesdays for the moving average.15  Next, we 
                                                 
15 We picked eight weeks as a window because our discussions with a number of hospital administrators 
indicated that hospital schedules were set one to two months in advance.  We also estimated models with 
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divide the hospital’s actual admission on a day by the day-specific eight-week moving 
average.  The index is centered on 1 and its value represents the percentage difference 
between the actual and the previous eight weeks’ average levels.  Descriptive statistics 
for these series on a daily basis are printed in Table 2-2.  For each day, there is substantial 
volatility in the admission index.  On 10 percent of the days, hospital admissions are 31 
to 42 percent above levels one would expect.  Important for our analysis, however, is the 
volatility of admissions on Friday and Saturday.  Admissions on these two days are the 
first and third most volatile days, based on the standard deviation of the index and the top 
two days when volatility is measured as the 90/10 ratio.  
Hospitals have a number of options to deal with these surges in admissions, 
including using nurses from other units, extending overtime, calling in nurses from home, 
and using temporary nurses.  Anecdotal evidence suggests these procedures are less than 
adequate to deal with large shocks to patient census.   A Chief Financial Officer from a 
network of hospitals notes that “One of the most complex financial and operational 
challenges that hospitals and health systems face today is a widely fluctuating patient 
census…The question is, how should we flex when the census goes up by 40 percent in a 
short amount of time? We typically deal with that by calling all the available nurses in on 
short notice, but we really don’t have a system that works smoothly for both the hospital 
and the nurses.”16  In a policy document discussing the California nurse staffing law, the 
Service Employees International Nurse Alliance notes that “Nurses on medical/surgical 
units report they experience large fluctuations in patient census throughout a shift, and a 
                                                                                                                                                 
four-week moving averages and the results from these models were qualitatively similar to the ones 
presented here.  In Table 7, we demonstrate that the results are not sensitive to the number of days after 





lack of available nursing capacity to respond to this variation (p 8).”17  In the winter of 
1997/1998, California was hit with a particularly heavy flu season.  Hospitals were filled 
to capacity during this period, and there were widespread reports of patients not receiving 
adequate care.  A report about this particular event by the California state government 
noted that, “Given the lack of a similar seasonal respiratory disease burden over the 
preceding years and decreasing hospital staff resources, hospitals were unprepared to deal 
with the sudden demand for services.”18  The inability to deal with a shock to patient 
census can lead to a decline in patient health.  A study by Leape et al. (1995) of 247 
adverse drug events in one particular hospital noted that a major reason for the errors was 
"excessive workloads due to inability to match staffing assignments to the clinical load 
when there were fluctuations in patient census and severity of illness."  In response to 
these concerns, Title 22 CCR 70217(q) of the California nurse/staffing law now requires 
hospitals to plan for routine fluctuations in patient census and requires that the 
nurse/staffing law hold at all points, not just on average.  Unpredictable events such as an 
earthquake or a terrorist attack would not be considered ‘routine fluctuations’ but a spike 
in admissions during the flu season would be considered routine.   
 
2.3.2 Data 
The primary data set for this analysis is an administrative hospital discharge data 
set that contains a census of discharges in the state of California over the 1996-2000 
periods. The data set is maintained by the State of California Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development (OSHPD).  Public use versions of the data include 





information on hospital identification, month and day of admission, total length of stay, 
up to thirty diagnoses and up to twenty performed procedures, the lag between admission 
and the performance for each procedure, total charges, expected payer, patient 
characteristics (e.g., age, sex and race) and type of care (e.g., acute care, psychiatric care, 
chemical dependency recovery care etc.).  The data also have information on the source 
of admission such as home or other acute care hospital and disposition, including whether 
the patient died during hospitalization or was transferred to another facility.  The data do 
not contain the exact date of admission, which is needed for this project.  This variable is, 
however, available in the restricted-use version of the data obtained for this project.  The 
restricted-use data also contain a scrambled Social Security Number, which allows us to 
track patients over time.  This same scrambled Social Security Number also allows us to 
link discharge records to Vital Statistics data. Over the five years in our sample, there are 
approximately 18 million hospital discharges in total.  We initially restrict our attention to 
all discharges after excluding labor, children under 17-years-old, and mental health 
patients,19 leaving us with 9.9 million records.   We call this the adult medical and 
surgical admissions sample. 
 
2.3.3 Outcomes 
Although the hospital discharge files have very detailed data, there are a limited 
number of outcomes that one can use to measure adverse events.  As we noted above, one 
way hospitals can deal with higher than expected admissions is to discharge patients 
early, so our first outcome is length of stay measured in days.  If we assume that the 
                                                 
19 We exclude sub-groups mentioned above since they are typically treated in separate wings of the 




patient's condition on discharge is homogeneous, decreased length of stay shows 
increased efficiency meaning that hospitals performed better care.  Without the 
homogeneity assumption, a shorter length of stay may indicate patients were discharged 
before they were fully recovered.   
The next outcome we will use is in-hospital mortality, which has been used in 
many other studies including Bell and Redelmeier, Tarnow-Mordi et al., and Pronovost et 
al., and can be identified directly from the hospital discharge record.  Death from less 
than optimal care may not always happen in a hospital, however.  A patient may die soon 
after discharge from poor care in the hospital, a complication generated by the hospital 
stay, or being discharged too early.  We can identify deaths over a fixed period after 
admission, either in the hospital or not, by linking the hospital discharge data with 
California vital statistics records.  Given the immediacy of the shock to admissions that 
we measure, we identify whether the death occurred within 7 and 14 days from 
admission. 
A third type of outcome is hospital readmission.  If patients are discharged before 
they are fully recovered, they are at a greater risk of being rehospitalized.  We can 
identify readmissions by matching inpatient records over time using the scrambled Social 
Security Number.  Because we match by a patient identification number, we can identify 
readmissions even if the patient was admitted to a different hospital.20 We construct 
indicators for whether a patient is readmitted within 7 and 30 days of the initial 
admission.   
                                                 
20 We cannot however identify a readmission if it occurs out of the state of California or if the patient is 
readmitted to a federal hospital, which are not in our data.  Likewise, we cannot identify an out-of-hospital 
death if it occurs outside the state of California.  
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In-hospital mortality is a rare event and regardless of the quality of care, most 
inpatients are not at risk of dying in the hospital.  To focus attention on those most at risk 
of dying from substandard care, we restrict our attention to subsamples of patients who 
have the highest risk of death.  First, from our sample of adult medical and surgical 
admissions, we consider a sample of people whose primary diagnosis is one of the 100 
diseases with the highest number of in-hospital deaths in our five years worth of data.21  
We define disease categories by the first four digits of the ICD-9 CM codes.  We also 
consider a sample of the 50 diseases with the highest number of in-hospital deaths.  
Third, we select from the 100 diseases with the highest mortality counts, the 50 diseases 
with the highest mortality rates (deaths divided by inpatient admissions).22   
‘Failure to rescue’ is another subsample and it includes patients who present 
particular diseases that may be complications of admissions but who should, in the 
normal course of care, not die in the hospital from these complications .  The sample 
includes patients with pneumonia, deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism, sepsis, 
acute renal failure, shock/cardiac arrest, and gastrointestinal hemorrhage/acute ulcer. The 
underlying assumption is that hospitals that provide enough care by staff identify these 
complications quickly and treat them aggressively (Agency Healthcare Research and 
Quality, 2003).  Following the standard sample selection criteria, we will not include in 
this sample patients aged 75 years and older, newborns and neonates, and patients 
                                                 
21 Ten highest death counts diseases in this category are acute respiratory failure, pneumonia, organism 
unspecified, pneumonia due to inhalation of food or vomitus, congestive heart failure, unspecified, 
unspecified septicemia, intracerebral hemorrhage, cerebral artery occlusion, unspecified, subendocardial 
infarction, obstructive chronic bronchitis, acute renal failure, unspecified. 
 
22 Ten highest death rate diseases in this category are cardiac arrest, anoxic brain damage, shock without 
mention of trauma, abdominal aneurysm, ruptured, bronchus and lung, unspecified (malignant neoplasm), 
intracerebral hemorrhage, subarachnoid hemorrhage, ventricular fibrillation and flutter (cardiac 




transferred from acute care or long- term care facilities.  These patients are excluded 
because they can have high mortality rates for reasons having no relation to the quality of 
care, adding more noise than other groups to the model.   
Table 2-3 contains information about outcomes and basic demographic 
characteristics for admissions in the California hospital discharge data for the various 
subsamples.  Most variables are dichotomous so we simply report the fraction for these 
variables.  For continuous variables, we report the sample mean and in parenthesis, the 
standard deviations of outcomes.  In the first column, we report data for all 9.9 million 
admissions for the adult medical and surgical admissions sample.23   During the five-year 
period of our analysis, patients were discharged from around 400 different hospitals.  
Twenty-eight hospitals opened sometime during our sample while sixty-five hospitals 
closed during the period.24   
The other columns in the table contain information about the subsamples we will 
use in our analysis.  These columns contain data for acute care admissions that began on 
a Thursday.  As we move from the full sample to samples with progressively higher 
mortality rates, there is an increase in the mean length of stay, mortality, and the 
readmission probabilities.  Comparing the outcomes for the 100 diseases with the highest 
mortality counts and the 50 diseases with the highest mortality rates, we see that 
mortality rates more than double and length of stay has increased by 42 percent.  Looking 
                                                 
23 Patients only enter the data set once they are discharged from a hospital.  As a result, some patients 
admitted to hospitals during the final months of 2000 would not have been discharged by the end of the 
year and therefore, they would not appear in our data set, making those patients who do appear a selected 
sample.  To avoid this sample selection problem, we did not include the last three months of data for each 
hospital. 
 
24 We are observing this in the discharge data set using the hospital identification number.  Therefore, we 
do not know the detailed reason of change.  For example, merging of hospitals and closing down of a 
hospital will appear exactly the same to us. 
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at the demographic characteristics, moving to a higher mortality sample increases average 
age, except in the failure to rescue sample where we deleted those 75 years of age or 
older.  Naturally, the fraction on Medicare increases and decreases accordingly with 
average age. In contrast, samples with higher mortality rates have a lower fraction of 
females and a lower fraction with private insurance.  
 
 
 2.3.4 Measuring Unexpected Hospital Admissions 
 
The primary covariate of interest is a measure of the number of unexpected 
admissions to a hospital over the next two days.  So for patients admitted on a Thursday, 
we count patients admitted on the following Friday and Saturday.  These admissions will 
only be a shock to effective hospital staff levels if they represent a change from recent 
averages.  We will use two methods to measure these unexpected shocks to admission.  
The first method is based on a moving average of admissions for a hospital.  Specifically, 
we sum admissions over the next two days, then divide by the moving average of this 
value from the previous eight weeks.25  Hospitals vary considerably in size, and this 
moving average index takes this into account.  The eight-week average allows for 
expansions in hospital size and any secular or seasonal trends in admissions.  To 
construct this index, we delete the first eight weeks of data for any hospital.  We also 
delete small hospitals, which we define as those with fewer than 10 admissions per week.  
Even after this sample selection decision, we had a small number of cases with extreme 
values that could be due to a variety of factors, including coding errors in the hospital 
                                                 
25  We also constructed an index where we created day-specific moving averages, then averaged the two 
days` indices.  So for Thursday's admissions, we averaged the eight- week moving average for Friday and 
Saturday.  Our results are robust regardless of moving average construction methods. 
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identification code.  As a result, we dropped any moving average based admission index 
that is 150 percent larger than the 99th percentile of the distribution.  We call this variable 
the Friday/Saturday Moving Average Admission Index. 
There is tremendous seasonal variation in hospital admissions.  Hospitals tend to 
have higher admissions during the winter season due to the high incidence of respiratory 
diseases such as pneumonia.  This cyclic pattern is known to hospitals and they can adjust 
their staffing accordingly, so this type of movement in admissions may not be 
unexpected.  We base a second index of hospital admissions on regression residuals from 
a hospital-specific regression that controls for this type of cyclic pattern in admissions.  
Specifically, using up to 60 months of data for each hospital, we run a regression of 
hospital admission counts for hospital h on day t on a time trend based on the months in 
the sample and trend squared (1 for the first month in the sample, 2 for the second, etc.), 
monthly dummy variables (January, February, etc.), day of the week dummy variables 
and a dummy variable for whether the day is a Federal holiday.26   For Thursday 
admissions, we sum the actual admissions on Friday and Saturday, then divide by the 
sum of the predicted admissions for these two days.  We call this variable the 
Friday/Saturday Regression-Based Admission Index.   
Table 2-4 shows the distribution for the Friday/Saturday Moving Average 
Admission Index and the corresponding values for the regression-based index. Both 
indices are unimodal and symmetric, with means and medians equal to 1.  For the 
Friday/Saturday Moving Average Admission Index, the 25th and 75th percentiles are 13 
                                                 
26 For most hospitals, these regressions appear to fit the data well, especially for larger hospitals.  However, 
in some cases, in particular for smaller hospitals, the model fit is poor.  We dropped hospitals where the R2 
was less than 0.5.   The poor fit was almost exclusively due to small daily admission counts, so the R2 




percent below and above the median, respectively, and the 5th and 95th percentiles are 32 
percent below and 37 percent above the median, respectively.  For the Friday/Saturday 
Regression-Based Admission Index, the 25th and 75th percentiles are 10 percent above and 
below the median, respectively, and the 5th and 95th percentiles are 25 percent below and 
27 percent above the median, respectively.    
 
 
 2.3.5 Econometric Specification 
  
In contrast to the previous literature in this area that utilizes cross-hospital 
variation to identify the impact of hospital staffs, we use a within-group model that 
allows us to control for differences in fixed-hospital characteristics that may be correlated 
with outcomes.  Outcomes (Y) vary across patients i, hospitals h and time t and the basic 
reduced-form model we estimate is of the form: 
 
(1)     Yiht = βXiht + λ(Friday/Saturday Admission Indexht) + uh +  YEARrst  + MONTHrst +  
νiht  
 
The vector X contains individual-level control variables that measure patient 
demographic characteristics (such as age, race, sex, and insurance status), and acuity (as 
measured by the 4-digit version of the International Classification of Disease 9th version, 
Clinical Modification 27 (ICD-9CM) codes).   For the failure to rescue sample, we 
controlled the severity of illness in more detail since this is a higher-risk sample.  The 
variable uh is a hospital-specific fixed effect which controls for permanent differences 
                                                 
27 The ICD-9CM codes are comprised of 5 digits such as xxx.xx, and moving left to right in the code, the 
numbers have a hierarchical structure.  The first digit is a broader classification and moving to the right in 
the code, the numbers provide more detailed information about the condition. 
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across hospitals in the outcomes of their patients.  To control for seasonal and secular 
variation in outcomes, we also use monthly and yearly dummy variables.  We also added 
a dummy variable to indicate whether the admission occurred on a Federal holiday.   
Because we expect hospitals of different sizes and in different parts of the state to have 
different seasonal and secular cycles, we allow the month and year effects to vary by 
hospital size (s) and region (r).  We use four different hospital sizes (those with maximum 
occupancy less than 50, between 50 and 150, between 150 and 300 and 300 over) and 14 
different service regions.28  Finally, νiht is a random error.   
The key covariate in the model is the Friday/Saturday Moving Average Admission 
Index.  When Y is defined as an adverse event, we expect the coefficient λ to be positive, 
signifying that patient outcomes deteriorate when effective staff levels drop.   
 
2.4 Results 
Table 2-5 presents the results of equation (1) using the six key outcome measures 
and the 100 diseases with the highest mortality counts sample admissions on Thursdays.  
In these regressions, the measure of hospital staff levels is the Friday/Saturday Moving 
Average Admission Index.  We report results for six outcomes:  length of stay, died in the 
hospital, died within 7 and 14 days of admission, and readmitted within 7 and 30 days.  
We estimate all models as linear regressions, although the last five outcomes are 
dichotomous.29  For each outcome, we estimate two models.  The first uses the admission 
                                                 
28 These 14 regions are defined by the United States Department of Health and Human Services for health 
planning on a regional basis and include Los Angeles, Orange County, etc. 
29 Given the sample sizes and the large number of fixed-effects in our analysis, we were unable to estimate 
logit regression models for many of the dichotomous outcomes with standard software packages.  
However, we were able to estimate a complete set of logit regression results for the sample that contains the 
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index added linearly to the model.  To capture possible non-linearities between the staff 
level and patient outcomes, the second model includes dummy variables for the quintile 
value of the Friday/Saturday Moving Average Admission Index.  The cutoffs for these 
values are reported in the bottom of Table 2-4.  In these models, index values between the 
40th ad 60th percentile values are considered the reference group. 
To save space, we do not report coefficients on the other covariates although the 
results for these variables are comparable to results from other studies.30   
The first panel of the table reports results for the Friday/Saturday Moving 
Average Admission Index added as a linear variable.  The numbers in parentheses in the 
table are standard errors.  None of the results using this variable are statistically 
significant except for the result in the length of stay equation. Below each standard error, 
we report the magnitude of the coefficient in elasticity form, giving the percentage 
change in the outcome for a percentage change in the index.  In all cases, the elasticities 
are very small, signifying that even large shocks to Friday/Saturday admission will have 
little impact on the outcomes of patients admitted on Thursdays.  Focusing on one 
particular result, consider the coefficient on the index for the “died in hospital” equation.  
The value of the Friday/Saturday Moving Average Admission Index of 1.4 is 40 percent 
above the sample mean and occurs roughly 5 percent of the time.  Even with this large 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 diseases with the highest mortality rate sample.  The estimated marginal effects on the Friday/Saturday 
Moving Average Admission Index variable are as follows:  Died in hospital 0.0008, Died within 7 days of 
admission, -0.0014; Readmitted within 7 days, 0.0029; readmitted within 30 days, 0.0065.  We note that 
these marginal effects are very close to the linear probability estimates for these samples that are reported 
in Table 6.   
30 For example, we found that males had lower in-hospital mortality rates compared to females, blacks had 
lower rates compared to whites, Hispanics had lower rates compared to non-Hispanics, and in-hospital 
mortality increased nearly monotonically with age.  These results are similar to those found in Dobkin 
(2003).  We also found higher mortality rates for patients admitted on Federal holidays.  There was no 




shock, the coefficient in Table 2-5 suggests that the probability of death will increase by 
only 8 ten thousands of a percentage point or one tenth of one percent of the sample 
mean.  The standard errors on many estimates in Table 2-5 are however very large, 
compared to the parameter estimates.  As a result, we cannot rule out the possibility that a 
surge in admissions has a more substantial impact on outcomes.  Again, focusing on the 
results from the ‘died in hospital equation,’ the top end of the 95 percent confidence 
interval for this parameter is 0.002748.  If this value is the true impact of the admissions 
index on in-hospital mortality, then a surge in admissions over the next two days that is 
40 percent over the sample mean would increase in-hospital mortality by 0.0011, which 
is now 1.2 percent of the sample mean.  Subsequently, although we can conclude there is 
no statistically significant impact of a surge in admissions on inpatient mortality, we 
cannot reject a hypothesis that suggests the impact is of modest quantitative importance.  
Table 2-9 presents estimates from larger samples that reduce the sampling variance by a 
considerable amount and helps reduce the uncertainty about the estimated impact.   
In contrast to the results for length of stay and mortality, the results suggest a 
larger impact of a surge in admissions on hospital readmission rates, but these results are 
again of modest magnitude.  The elasticities for the 7- and 30-day hospital readmission 
rates are 0.042 and 0.028, respectively, but neither result is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  Looking at the 7-day readmission rates, a 40 percentage point 
increase in the admission index will increase readmission probabilities by .0007, or 1.65 
percent of the sample mean.  
In the bottom half of the table, we report results where we include the dummy 
variables for quintiles of the distribution for the moving average index.  Looking at the 
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coefficients individually, the only statistically significant coefficient is a negative 
coefficient for the dummy indicating less than the 20th percentile of the index in the 30-
day readmission rate equation.  In most cases, the coefficients are small in magnitude, 
and in general, there is no monotonic relationship in any of the regressions.  For example, 
one might expect that if positive shocks to admission pose a risk to patients, that negative 
shocks imply more care from nurses.  In most cases, the sign on the decile dummy 
variables below or above the median category are of the same sign and magnitude.    
In Table 2-6, we report results for the three other samples (50 diseases with the 
highest mortality counts, 50 diseases with the highest mortality rate, and failure to 
rescue).  At the top of the table, we repeat results for the 100 diseases with the highest 
mortality counts for comparison purposes.  In these three samples, we reduce the sample 
to patients with a higher risk of in-hospital mortality.  Although we lose sample size in 
the process, our hope is to examine data for patients who may be more at risk to lapses in 
care.  In this table, we report results using the Friday/Saturday Moving Average 
Admission Index.31   
 In the middle two blocks of Table 2-6, we find a statistically significant negative 
coefficient on the Friday/Saturday Moving Average Admission Index in the length of stay 
equation indicating that when admissions surge on Friday and Saturday, patients admitted 
on Thursdays are more likely to be discharged early.  The coefficient is however very 
small, generating an elasticity of -0.03 in the 50 diseases with the highest mortality rate 
                                                 
31 One concern with the results in Tables 5 and 6 is that there is too much patient heterogeneity in severity 
to be accurately controlled for with a vector of ICD-9 dummy variables.  We attempted to look at patients 
with more narrow disease definitions but the samples were too small to be meaningful.  For example, we 
constructed samples of patients with pneumonia or acute myocardial infarctions admitted on Thursdays, 
and although patients with these diseases had higher than average death rates, these samples had only 
74,456 and 39,171 observations, respectively.  
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models.  Focusing on this sample for a moment, a 40 percentage point increase in the 
Friday/Saturday admissions index would reduce average length of stay by about a tenth 
of a day, which is about 1.2 percent of sample mean.  To put this result into perspective, 
suppose a hospital that had 50 admissions on a Thursday and based on their conditions, 
each patient was expected to stay in the hospital for 8 days, which is close to the average 
in Table 2-6.  If 1 of these 50 patients was discharged after only 2 days, the average 
length of stay for this particular Thursday would fall by 0.12.  So although the coefficient 
is statistically significant, the result is quantitatively small.   
In Table 2-6, we find statistically insignificant and quantitatively small impacts of 
Friday/Saturday admissions shocks on in-hospital mortality, plus 7 and 14 day mortality 
rates for both the 50 diseases with the highest mortality admissions and the 50 diseases 
with the highest mortality rate admissions.  In these models, the coefficients are small 
relative to their standard errors and more importantly, even if we assume the true effect of 
the admission index is at the upper limit of the 95th percent confidence interval, the 
results suggest quantitatively small effects.  The coefficients on the Friday/Saturday 
Admission Index in the readmission models for the first three samples in Table 2-6 are 
always positive, indicating admission shocks increase readmission rates.  The results in 
the 50 diseases with the highest mortality counts regression model are statistically 
significant.  The largest elasticity is 0.0691 for the 7-day readmission rate in the 50 
diseases with the highest mortality model.  The coefficient on the index in that model is 
0.0033 indicating that a 40 percentage point movement in the index will increase the 
readmission probability by 0.0013 percentage points or about 2.7 percent of the sample 
mean.  To put this result into perspective, for every 10,000 patients who are admitted on a 
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Thursday, we would expect 480 to be readmitted and this number would increase by 13 
due to a 40 percent above average shock to Friday/Saturday admissions.      
In the last block of results in Table 2-6, we present results for the “failure to 
rescue” sample.  None of the estimates is statistically significant except readmission 
within 30 days.  The results on length of stay show a negative sign which is consistent 
throughout different subsamples.  Contrary to some previous samples, the coefficients on 
the admission index in all three mortality regressions and the 7-day readmission equation 
are all negative.  The most striking result is for the admission index in the 30-day 
readmission, where the coefficient is a statistically significant 0.0229.  A 40 percentage 
point increase in the index will increase the readmission probability by 0.0091 percentage 
point or 7.9 percent of the sample mean.  This is a fairly large impact but the disparity 
between the results for the 7-day readmission rate is troubling. 
In Table 2-7, we consider alternate ways to construct our analysis sample and our 
moving average admissions index.  In the first block of the table, we reproduce the basic 
results from Table 2-5 where we use the Friday/Saturday Moving Average Admissions 
Index in the sample patients admitted on Thursday.  In the next block of results, we retain 
the same sample of patients but define the moving average admission index only for 
Friday admissions.  The results are qualitatively similar to those from the block of results.  
In the third block of results, we construct a moving average admissions index based on 
Friday, Saturday and Sunday admissions.  The results from this model are uniformly 
larger than those from the first block of Table 2-7, with the coefficients on the index in 
the length of stay increasing by 29 percent, doubling in the readmissions equations, and 
increasing by a factor of 15 in the died within 14 days of admission equation. This last 
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result is still not statistically significant, but the big standard errors on this coefficient 
suggest that the large change in the coefficient could reflect sampling variation.  In later 
results where we expand the sample, we will re-examine this issue in detail.  Given the 
increase in the coefficient on the admission index in the hospital readmission equations, 
these results are now statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.  Finally, 
in the final block of results in this table, we estimate a model where we include in the 
sample patients admitted on a Friday and use a one-day admission index based on 
Saturday admissions only.  These coefficients are uniformly smaller than the estimates 
from the first block of the table.   
We have reproduced results similar to those in Table 2-6 using the 
Friday/Saturday Regression-Based Admission Index, and these results are reported in 
Table 2-8.  Note that in general, the results from Table 2-8 are very similar to those in 
Table 2-6.  However, because there is less variation in the regression-based admission 
index, the standard errors in Table 2-8 are larger than those for similar models from Table 
2-6.  The results in Table 2-8 for the 100 diseases with the highest mortality counts are 
very similar to those in Table 2-6.  The only statistically significant coefficient on the 
regression-based admission index in this group of estimates is on length of stay.  In the 
sample with the 50 diseases with the highest mortality counts, the coefficient on the 
regression-based index in the 7-day readmission equation is statistically significant, 
which is similar to the results for the moving-average index in Table 2-6.  Like the results 
for the 50 diseases with the highest mortality rates in Table 2-6, the numbers in Table 2-8 
indicate that one statistically significant impact in the regression-based models, which is 
the length of stay specification.  In the failure to rescue sample, the coefficient on the 
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moving-average index that was statistically significant in Table 2-6 is now much smaller 
in size and statistically insignificant in Table 2-8.  
We have focused on Thursday admissions because lower staff levels on Saturday 
put the patients at risk to admissions fluctuations and because the admissions index has 
the largest variance on Friday and Saturday.  This selection criterion does however come 
at a cost:  we lose six-sevenths of the sample.  In Table 2-5, although the parameter 
estimates for the admission index in the mortality outcome equations were quantitatively 
small, the standard errors were large enough that we could not reject the hypothesis that a 
surge in admissions produced modest impacts on outcomes.  To boost the sample size, we 
generate estimates similar to those in Table 2-5 but instead of just using Thursday 
admissions, we use admissions from the 100 diseases with the highest mortality counts 
for all days of the week.  This increases the sample by a factor 7 to almost 3.7 million 
observations.  We use the same method of 8-week moving average of admissions over 
the next two days to construct the index. So for patients admitted on a Monday, we 
construct the index based on the Tuesday and Wednesday admissions.  To control for 
variation within a week in the composition of patients who enter hospitals, we add 
dummies for the day of the week.  The results from this regression are reported in the first 
block in Table 2-9 and the estimates are, in general, smaller in magnitude than the 
estimates in Table 2-5.  We find a much smaller impact of admission shocks on length of 
stay.  The coefficient on the admission index in the 7- and 14- day readmission equations 
are one half and one quarter the size of the estimates in Table 2-5, but the coefficient on 
the admission index in the 7-day readmission equation is now statistically significant at 
the 95 percent confidence level.  The coefficients on the admission index in the three 
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mortality regressions are now much smaller than the corresponding estimates in Table 2-
5.  Looking at the died in hospital result, the top end of the 95 percent confidence interval 
suggests that a 40 percent increase in admission above the mean would increase in-
hospital mortality probabilities by .0027 percentage points which is only about .45 
percent of the sample mean.   
In Table 2-7 above, we reported results where we used our sample of patients 
admitted on Thursdays and we included as the key covariate an admission index that was 
based on the next three days’ admissions (Friday, Saturday and Sunday).  In that sample, 
we found a very large increase in the coefficient on the admission index in the died 
within 14 days equation, but the coefficient was still smaller than its standard error.  We 
examine whether this same movement in the coefficient occurs when we re-estimated a 
similar model in our all-day sample of 3.7 million admissions.  Following the model 
estimated for Table 2-7, we included as the key covariate an admission index based on 
the next three days.  In this new model, the coefficient (standard error) on the three-day 
admission index in the died with 14 days of admission equation is 0.000099 (0.0007), 
which is a tiny mean estimate.     
In the final block of results in Table 2-9, we consider an even larger sample of 
admissions in an attempt to reduce the stand errors even further.  In these models, we 
begin with our sample of adult medical and surgical admissions, delete any disease that 
has less than 100 cases over the five years in our sample, and then delete any remaining 
disease that has no in-hospital mortality.  This leaves us with a sample of 8.67 million 
admissions, but the mortality rates and 7-day readmission rates in this larger set of 
admissions are about half the rates found in the other sample in Table 2-9.  In these 
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regressions, we again use the two-day moving average admission index as the covariate 
of interest.  In this model, we again find a modest and statistically significant impact of a 
surge in admission on the 7-day readmission rate.  A surge in admissions of 40 percent 
over the sample mean would increase the readmission probability within 7 days by .028 
percentage points which is 1.1 percent of the sample mean.  The coefficient of interest in 
the 30-day readmission equation is statistically insignificant and even if the true estimate 
were at the top end of the 95 percent confidence interval, a 40 percent increase in 
admission over the mean rate would increase readmission probabilities less than 1 percent 
of the sample mean.  The coefficients on the admission index in the three mortality 
regressions are all negative and statistically insignificant at conventional levels.  The 
results suggest that at best, a surge in admission will increase mortality by a small 
amount.  Consider the coefficient for the admission index in the died in hospital equation.  
Even if the true impact of the surge in admissions were at the top end of the 95 percent 
confidence interval, a 40 percent increase in admission over mean levels would increase 
in-hospital mortality rates by .0037 percentage points which is 0.1 percent of the sample 
mean.  Expanding the sample to over 8.6 million observations, we find there is no 
discernable impact of a surge in admissions on in-hospital mortality, a trivial but 
statistically precise drop in length of stay, and a statistically significant but small increase 
in hospital 7-day hospital readmission rates. 
 
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Although hospitals are subject to large shocks to admissions, we find little 
evidence that these fluctuations have any quantitative importance on care.  In some 
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models, we find statistically significant impacts of the Friday/Saturday admission index 
on length of stay and readmission probabilities but the impacts are small.  We find no 
impact of a surge in admission on any measure of mortality in any sample. In our largest 
samples, even if we consider the implied estimates at the top end of the 95 percent 
confidence interval, a surge in admissions is estimated to change mortality by a very 
small amount.   
There are a number of limitations to this work.  First, the data are for only one 
state in a five year period.  Second, and more importantly, we have no independent data 
about how hospitals deal with a sudden influx of patients.  Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that hospitals have a difficult time dealing with large fluctuations in patient census.  This 
was of course part of the motivation of the California law.  However, the lack of any 
quantitatively large impact of a surge in admissions could mean the hospitals have more 
degrees of freedom to deal with these situations than is typically revealed in the press on 
hospital workforce management. 
There are two possible interpretations of the results presented above.  The first 
suggests that contrary to the text we highlight in Section 3, hospitals were able to 
effectively deal with fluctuations in patient census prior to the passage of the California 
nurse staffing law.  A second interpretation is that reductions in the effective 
nurse/staffing ratio such as those we isolate here have, at best, modest impacts on patient 
outcomes.  We are unable to separate which hypothesis is correct.  Either way, our results 
suggest that the California nurse-staffing law should have minor measurable benefits on 
the outcomes we’ve considered here.     
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When a patient is injured due to the medical malpractice of a physician, the 
injured party can sue the physician for monetary compensation under negligent tort.32  
Compensation is typically paid for any loss of earnings capacity, pain and suffering, and 
reasonable medical expenses.  Most physicians buy malpractice insurance to insure 
themselves against the payout of malpractice cases.   
In the U.S., malpractice insurance premiums increased rapidly in the 1970's and 
1980's and again in the early part of this decade.  These recent hikes have led the 
American Medical Association to declare a 'malpractice premium crisis' in 20 states, 
including Florida, Pennsylvania and New York.33  Nationwide, malpractice insurance 
premiums increased 15 percent between 2000 and 2002.34  During the same time period, 
specialists in some areas experienced premium increases of more than 100 percent.35   
Concerns about rising malpractice premiums have caught the attention of 
lawmakers at the federal and state level.  Beginning in 2003, Congress considered federal 
tort law reform proposals four times, but each time the bills failed.36 A fifth tort reform 
bill (H.R.5) has passed through the House, and is currently awaiting discussion in the 
                                                 
32 Torts are civil wrongs recognized by law as grounds for a lawsuit.  Among three general categories 
(intentional torts, strict liability torts, negligent torts) medical malpractice falls into the negligent category.   
33 http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11871.html 
34 Based on the author's calculation using the Medical Liability Monitor annual premium survey.  No 
weights were used. 
35 Malpractice premiums increased 115 percent for OB/GYNs in Oregon and 110 percent for general 
surgeons in Mississippi. 
36 Tort law is state law.   (http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/torts.html). 
 
 39
Senate.37  Most tort reform proposals include such restrictions as limits on non-economic 
jury damage awards, limits on attorney fees, and statutes of limitations in all medical 
malpractice lawsuits.  Similar reforms have been passed in a number of states (Dewey, 
2005). 
One premise behind these reform bills is that the current tort system encourages 
an excessive amount of litigation, placing doctors at an increased risk of being sued for 
malpractice.  Reform sponsors also argue that greater malpractice risk adversely affects 
the delivery of health care in two ways.  First, an increase in risk may discourage doctors 
from treating people with certain conditions or from conducting risky (but potentially 
beneficial) procedures.  The 2003 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG) survey reported that 14 percent of respondents stopped practicing obstetrics as a 
result of the risk of litigation.  This type of response to malpractice risk may be leading to 
some serious restrictions in access to necessary healthcare.  Second, healthcare utilization 
may increase as doctors alter their practice patterns.  To avoid a lawsuit or increase the 
chance of winning a malpractice suit, a doctor may perform procedures that have little or 
no medical benefit to the patients, but that protect him from possible future litigation.  
This type of behavior is typically referred to as defensive medicine (Kessler and 
McClellan, 1996). 
Opponents of reform bills believe that limiting compensation for the injured can 
be unfair to the people who have already suffered significantly from medical malpractice.  
Reform critics are also often concerned that the deterrent effects of tort law would be 
                                                 
37 H.R.5 passed the House in July 2005.  The bill includes a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages. 
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weakened as a result.38  It is thus ultimately an empirical question whether doctors 
respond to changes in malpractice risk by altering their practice patterns.   
Given the potential importance of tort reform and the 'malpractice crisis', there is 
surprisingly little empirical evidence regarding the impact of malpractice risk on health 
care delivery.  Kessler and McClellan (1996) found some evidence of defensive medicine 
in their analysis of heart attack patients covered by Medicare.  But they focus primarily 
on health care expenditures and thus do not shed light on the mechanisms through which 
this effect operates.  While informative, most other studies have important limitations 
including insufficient variation due to a short time span, possible omitted variable bias, or 
an inappropriate measure of malpractice risk.   
First of all, we need to know whether doctors have an incentive to change their 
behavior as a result of malpractice risk.  Most physicians are fully insured against the 
financial costs of malpractice such as damages and legal defense expenses.39  In addition, 
medical malpractice insurance typically does not have a mechanism such as deductibles, 
or experience rating, either of which would give the physician a direct financial incentive 
to respond to increase in risk.40  Litigation may, however, reduce current earnings due to 
the loss of practice time, or future earnings due to the loss of reputation.  Additionally, 
there may be substantial legal expenses and emotional stress associated with a lawsuit.41  
Therefore, doctors may have a strong incentive to alter practice patterns even with 
malpractice insurance.   
                                                 
38 The two purposes of tort law are monetary compensation for the injured and the deterrence of similar 
negligence by physicians in the future. 
39 Of all OB/GYNs surveyed, 94.4 percent reported being covered by medical malpractice liability 
insurance (2003 ACOG survey).  The most common insurance policies limit coverage to $1 million per 
case or $3 million per year.  Only 1.6 percent of claims in my data paid more than $1 million. 
40 Most insurance premiums are experience rated.  For example, someone with an auto accident history will 
pay a higher auto insurance premium compared to a similar person without an accident. 
41 Sometimes doctors hire their own attorneys. 
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One practice area that is thought to be particularly affected by high malpractice 
risk is OB/GYN.42  Between 1994 and 2003, twenty four percent of OB/GYN doctors in 
the state of Massachusetts either made settlement payments themselves or had payments 
made from their insurance carriers.  This is substantially higher than most other 
specialties.   For example, 15 percent of general surgeons and only 4 percent of internal 
medicine specialists had such payments (The Board of Registration in Medicine, 
Massachusetts, 2004).  The ACOG found that 76.3 percent of OB/GYNs experienced at 
least one lawsuit during their career in a 2003 survey.   
In OB/GYN, it is often suggested that malpractice concerns encourage doctors to 
perform more cesarean sections (c-sections) than medically needed.  For example, the 
birth of a neurologically-impaired infant, the most prevalent reason for a lawsuit in the 
OB/GYN specialty, can occur before or during deliveries (ACOG survey, 2003).  
However, in deliveries involving a birth injury, doctors are more likely to be suspected as 
negligent when the baby is delivered vaginally due to the limited control of progress 
compared to cesarean section (Sachs, 1989).  Therefore, some have suggested that 
plaintiffs can more easily argue doctors' negligence, such as the lack of a timely response 
for more invasive procedures, when a baby is delivered vaginally.  Others have argued 
that the rapid increase of the U.S. c-section rate in the 1980's relative to England (which 
showed a similar c-section rate to the U.S. in the 1970's) is attributable to the difference 
in legal environments.  There is also more than a 10 percentage point difference in c-
                                                 
42 Based on Medical Liability Monitor, an OB/GYN practicing in New York City in 2003 paid 5.3 times 
more for malpractice insurance than an internist, and 1.6 times more than a general surgeon. 
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section rates between some states, with some of this potentially explained by differences 
in legal environments.43 
In my empirical analysis, I measure the malpractice risk that doctors face using 
the National Practitioner Data Bank.  This data set is a national universe of malpractice 
claims resolved either by settlement or jury verdicts for the 15 year period from 1990 to 
2005.  This long time period allows me to exploit the considerable variation both between 
states and within a state over time in malpractice risk at the extensive (number of cases) 
and intensive (awards per case) margins.  I calculate malpractice risk in two ways: as 
either the number of OB/GYN claims per 1,000 births in each state over the last three 
years, or the amount of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in $1,000s in each state over the 
last three years.44   
The malpractice risk data are then combined with the Natality detail data set 
which is a census of all live births in the U.S.  Detailed information in the data is used to 
construct a series of treatment measures that have been suspected to be influenced by the 
malpractice risk OB/GYN doctors face.  The large sample size allows me to examine 
subsamples that may be particularly susceptible to changes in practice style.  For 
example, a doctor's response to higher malpractice risk might vary by patient 
characteristics such as history of a previous c-section, complications of labor (breech 
presentation, gestational diabetes, multiple births), or socioeconomic background of the 
mother.  I therefore examine whether malpractice risk alters procedure choice overall and 
also for these particular at-risk subgroups.  
                                                 
43 In 2003, the c-section rate in Florida was 30.8 percent compared to 19.2 percent in Utah based on 
National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2005. 
44 I use three years for the following two reasons.  The average litigation process takes three to four years 
and malpractice risk is a noisy measure because the incidence rate is low. 
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One challenge for reliable identification is that malpractice risk as defined above 
may be correlated with other factors related to the treatment decision, such as unobserved 
patient characteristics, physician quality or practice style.  For example, if doctors 
respond to malpractice risk by performing more c-sections, this may decrease the 
malpractice risk because a c-section lowers the probability of a lawsuit compared to 
vaginal delivery (reverse causality).  In other words, the probability of a lawsuit is not 
only a function of the legal environment but also a function of procedure choices and 
other factors as well.  To address this issue, I use an instrumental variables (IV) 
identification strategy that will capture only the malpractice risk generated by a state’s 
legal environment.  In particular, I use the malpractice risk in non-OB/GYN specialties as 
an instrument for the OB/GYN risk measure.    
My findings demonstrate that cesarean section rates are not responsive to medical 
malpractice risk.  Additionally, utilization of  health care, measured by the number of 
prenatal visits during pregnancy, is also insignificantly related to malpractice risk.  I also 
find that malpractice risk has no statistical or qualitatively important impact on the use of 
other procedures such as ultrasound, fetal monitoring, forceps, or vacuum.  The one 
exception is amniocentesis, a diagnostic procedure that is used substantially more as 
malpractice risk increases.  Taken together, the findings suggest that malpractice risk 
does not have a significant effect on the behavior of obstetricians.   
The chapter is arranged as follows.  Section 2 reviews the previous literature on 
malpractice risk and its impact on physician behavior.  Section 3 describes the data used, 
the empirical analysis and my identification strategy.  Section 4 reports the empirical 
results and Section 5 discusses the implications of my findings.   
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3.2 Literature Review 
Although there has been considerable discussion about the impact of defensive 
medicine on medical care costs, there is relatively little evidence that malpractice risk 
alters medical decisions.  There are two types of studies that have attempted to measure 
the behavioral changes induced by malpractice risk.  The first type uses surveys of 
providers while the second type examines the reduced-form relationship between 
healthcare expenditures and outcomes and the changes in the malpractice environment.   
A number of different surveys have tried to assess how physicians responded to 
tort litigation.  For example, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) conducted a 
survey of three specialties including OB/GYN.  The survey described a hypothetical 
scenario and asked doctors which diagnostic procedures they would prescribe.  Doctors 
were also asked to choose the major reason for the procedure choices with one possible 
response being malpractice risk.  They found that, by their definition, 8 percent of 
diagnostic procedures preformed are medically unnecessary.   
Kessler and McClellan (1998) combined survey data from the American Medical 
Association Socioeconomic Monitoring System (AMA SMS) with tort reform data and 
found that doctors who faced higher malpractice risk increased both record keeping and 
the number of diagnostic tests preformed.  However, it is well known that surveys are 
potentially subject to response bias (Grant and McInnes, 2004).  This problem may be 
particularly acute in direct physician surveys, because physicians may be tempted to 
exaggerate the impact of malpractice pressure in order to buttress the political argument 
in favor of liability reform (Klingman et al., 1996).  Indeed, physicians estimated the 
probability of defending against a malpractice claim in any one year to be about three 
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times higher than the actual probability of such a claim arising (Lawthers et al., 1992; 
Weiler et al., 1993).     
Using state tort reforms that cap an injured patient's award as an exogenous 
change in malpractice risk, Kessler and McClellan (1996) showed that total expenditure 
declined for Medicare patients with acute myocardial infarction and ischemic heart 
disease in states that experienced tort reform.  However, these states did not experience 
any statistically significant change in outcomes such as mortality.  The authors were 
unable to tell which procedures were ‘defensive’ in nature (i.e., whether fewer diagnostic 
tests were prescribed or less aggressive treatment lowered costs).   
Using data from the 1990-1992 periods, Dubay et al. (1999) analyzed a within-
group model correlating changes in c-section rates and malpractice premiums.  They 
found that higher OB/GYN malpractice premiums had a statistically insignificant impact 
on the rate of cesarean delivery among all births.  In contrast, they found that among 
unmarried and less than high school graduate mothers, a group suspected to have a higher 
rate of being a malpractice plaintiff, malpractice premiums had a statistically significant 
positive impact on the c-section rates.  While informative, there are two potential 
limitations of this study.  First, given the short sample period, there is some question as to 
whether there was sufficient within-panel variation in premiums to successfully identify 
their model.  Second, it is not clear whether higher premiums indicate an elevated 
malpractice risk for the doctor.  While premiums do depend both on claim frequency and 
claim severity, they also depend on other market factors, such as interest rates and market 
competitiveness, and hence may measure the malpractice environment poorly (Grant and 
McInnes, 2004).  Indeed, Black et al. (2005) did not find a strong correlation between 
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paid claims and malpractice insurance premiums.  A report by the Americans for 
Insurance Reform (2002) pointed out that medical insurance premiums are closely related 
to insurance market competition but not paid claims.45   
Baicker and Chandra (2004) utilized state-level data on premiums and closed 
claims to examine the impact of malpractice risk on healthcare delivery.  They examined 
average malpractice risk from 1992 to 1994 and compared it with the average malpractice 
risk from 1999 to 2002.  They found no statistically significant positive relationship 
between c-section rates and OB/GYN claims.  Their estimates are also possibly subject to 
an omitted variable bias problem that I mentioned earlier. 
Using hospital discharge data and closed claims data from Florida over the 1992-
1995 period, Grant and McInnes (2004) estimated the changes in doctor-specific c-
section rates after physicians experienced malpractice litigation.  They found that after 
litigation, physicians had a one-percentage point higher risk-adjusted c-section rate.  If 
the malpractice risk that a doctor faces depends on not only his/her experience of being 
sued, but also on the malpractice claim history for the same specialty in their region, 
Grant and McInnes' estimates are a lower bound estimate of the  true impact of 
malpractice risk.  Taken together, the previous literature provides conflicting evidence 
regarding the impact of increased malpractice risk on physician behavior.  
 




3.3 Empirical Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
There are two major sources of data for this study:  the National Practitioner Data 
Bank Public Use Data File and the Natality Detail File.  The National Practitioner Data 
Bank (NPDB) is an extensive collection of data on malpractice payouts, including pre-
trial settlements throughout the nation.  If a malpractice insurance carrier pays on behalf 
of a practitioner, the carrier is required by the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 
1986 to report data about the claim to the NPDB within 30 days of the payout.  This 
public-use data file is updated at the end of each quarter.46  For this project, I use the 
NPDB Public Use Data File containing reports received from September 1, 1990 through 
March 31, 2005.  I measure malpractice risk from 1992 to 1998 after dropping cases 
which took more than 6 years to resolve from injury occurrence, for consistency 
throughout the data period, because some claims take several years to resolve. 
The NPDB Public Use Data File records the year of injury and the year of report 
and has information about the size of the payment, related services (obstetric-related, 
medication-related, etc), practitioner's work state and practitioner's field of license 
(physician, pharmacist, dentist, etc.) for each case.47  To maintain confidentiality of the 
data, payment amounts are recorded into ranges only.48  Payments are also top coded at 
$105 million, but no payments exceeded this amount during my data period.     
                                                 
46 http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/publicdata.html 
47 For each claim, there are six potential dates of interest:  date of injury, date of opening a legal case, date 
of reporting to insurance company by doctors, date of a case closing (by jury verdict or settlement), 
payment date, and date of report (when the NPDB received the record).  Only year of injury and year of 
report are available in the data.  
48 For example, $10,000 increments are used for actual payments between $100,001 and $1 million, 
Payments between $1 million and $10 million are coded as the midpoint of $100,000 increments.  Between 
$10 million and $20 million, a $1 million increment is used.   
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Even though the NPDB is the most extensive data set about closed malpractice 
cases, it has several limitations.  First, it only lists closed cases with a positive payout.  In 
the introduction, I argued that there may be both psychic and economic costs to 
defending against a malpractice claim.  As a result, not counting cases with zero payout 
may be understating the malpractice risk faced by physicians.  Second, tort cases are 
decided locally (e.g., juries are selected at the county level) so there may be variation 
within a state in malpractice risk.  However, the NPDB does not identify sub-state 
geographic information, so I cannot measure any within-state variation in malpractice 
risk.  Third, the NPDB cannot link multiple defendants for a single case together when 
they are reported separately.  Fourth, hospitals are not included as providers.  Therefore, 
hospitals that are the sole defendants in a case are not included in the data set.  Likewise, 
closed cases in the NPDB that included both hospitals and physicians as defendants only 
list the physician defendants.  Despite these limitations, it is the most accurate source of 
information for the entire U.S. over a long period regarding physician malpractice risk. 
The Natality Detail File is a census of all live births in the U.S. and includes 
almost 24 million births for the 7 years (1992-1998) in which I have measures of 
malpractice risk.  These data have demographic information about the mother (age, 
education, marital status, race, and ethnicity), the father (age, race, and ethnicity), 
characteristics of the pregnancy (parity, plurality, gestation, maternal weight gain, 
smoking and drinking during pregnancy, prenatal visits, breech presentation, high blood 
 
 49
pressure and gestational diabetes), and method of delivery.  The data also include 
information about who attended the delivery, such as a midwife or a medical doctor.49   
 
3.3.2 Measuring Malpractice Risk 
I measure malpractice risk using closed claims information in the NPDB Public 
Use Data File.  Theoretical models of the tort liability system typically assume that 
agents respond to both the probability and the size of liability awards.  Subsequently, I 
construct two measures of malpractice risk: one that measures the number of cases 
(frequency) and another that measures the size of liability payments (severity) per birth.     
As I mentioned above, there is tremendous heterogeneity across medical 
specialties in the lifetime risk of being sued for malpractice.  This is not surprising.  
OB/GYNs care for different types of patients and perform a very different service than 
dermatologists or psychiatrists.  As a result, each specialty should have different 
underlying levels of malpractice risk.  For this reason, I measure malpractice risk within 
each specialty.   
The malpractice risk faced by doctors is also assumed to vary by state and year, 
based on several factors.  Each state has a different tort environment (tort law and 
precedent by jury, etc.).  Practice patterns also vary substantially for different regions 
(Nicholson and Epstein, 2003).  For the most part, insurance companies also set 
malpractice premiums according to a physicians' specialty, type of practice, and 
                                                 
49 In this analysis, I only use births delivered by medical doctors since midwives do not have the same 
procedure choices, such as cesarean section delivery, nor do they face the same malpractice risk.  Less than 
8 percent of births were delivered by midwives in the seven years worth of data I use.   
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geographical location (Quinn 1998).50  For example, OB/GYNs practicing in New York 
have very different malpractice risk from OB/GYNs practicing in Wyoming because of 
different legal environments as well as different practice patterns.    
The NPDB identifies both the year of injury and the year of report so the 
malpractice risk can be measured using one of these years as the frame of reference.  The 
key question to address is this: if doctors are altering their practice style based on 
malpractice risk, are they altering their behavior after alleged malpractice occurs (date of 
injury) or when a malpractice suit is paid out and then reported to the NPDB (date of 
report)?  Research on this question by Grant and McInnes (2004) suggests that behavior 
changes are associated with the incident that led to the malpractice claim, not with the 
closure of the claim.  Subsequently, I look for evidence that OB/GYN’s practice 
defensive medicine after an injury occurs.  Unfortunately, injury claims only make it into 
the NPDB once a case has been closed, which many times can be years after the injury.  
Therefore, I must define a consistent window after which an injury occurs when cases 
will be reported in the NPDB. 
Figure 3-1 reports the distribution of years when the case is reported to the NPDB 
for injuries that occurred in 1993 for all medical malpractice cases.51  The mean year of 
report is 1997.3, the median is 1997 (the fourth year after the injury), and the mode is 
1996 (the third year after the injury).  Note, however, that a small fraction of cases are 
being reported ten to twelve years after a patient is injured.  I find very similar results in 
                                                 
50 Type of practice means a hospital- or office-based practice.  Insurance companies define their own 
geographical categories.  Only nine big states such as New York, and California, have geographic variation 
in prices within a state.  For example, depending on the insurance carrier, there are three to six geographical 
regions within California in 2002.  The rest of the states tend to have one premium for each specialty.  I use 
state as the geographical level since only state is observed in NPDB. 
51 OB/GYN cases have the same shape of distribution with bigger mean year of 1998, the fifth year after 
the injury.   
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Figure 3-2 in which I graph the distribution of total dollars paid (in real 2002 dollars) for 
reported cases resulting from injuries in 1993.  Most cases are settled within a few years 
of the actual injury.  In Figure 3-3, I report the cumulative distribution of closed claims 
for injuries occurring in 1993.  Roughly 80 percent of cases are reported within six years 
of injury.   
 Although I have Natality data through the early 2000s and the NPDB data are 
reported through March of 2005, the long lag between injury and the claim report 
observed above means that I cannot use the latest years of data.  If the distribution of paid 
claims in 2002 is similar to the distribution in 1993, then only about 15 percent of 2002 
claims have been reported by March of 2005.52  In order to have a consistent measure of 
malpractice risk across all years in the sample, I will use the same window of years after 
injury for cases to be reported.  This will understate the total closed claims from earlier 
years in the sample, but all years will be treated equally.   
The choice of the length of the window that I will use requires tradeoffs. Using a 
longer window will generate more accurate measurement of risk but will reduce the 
available years of data that I can use from the Natality detail data.  For example, a two-
year window would allow me to use data through 2002 and a four year window would 
allow me to use data through 2000.53  Unfortunately, as the numbers in Figure 3-3 
illustrate, the shorter the window, the fewer actual reported claims will be included in the 
malpractice risk index.   
                                                 
52 The distribution of lags between injury year and report year is indeed very stable throughout my data 
period. 
53 Although I have data reported by March 2005 I assume that I have data until 2004 as a complete year. 
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I use a window of 6 years after the injury to construct the malpractice risk 
measure.54  Cases being reported within the same year that an injury happens are rare.55  
Therefore, I decided to drop cases reported in the same year when the injury occurred, 
basing this decision on the same logic I used to drop cases reported after 6 years from the 
injury.56   
With the text above as a backdrop, we can define malpractice risk in the following 
manner.  The variable sjtC  denotes the number of reported cases where the injury 
occurred in state s in year t, with the gap between injury and reporting measured in years 
by j.  The numbers of births in thousands in state s and year t are written as stB .  These 
variables can be used to construct the malpractice risk for OB/GYNs in state s in year t 
OB











The number of malpractice injuries in a given year should be proportional to the 
size of the exposure, so I divide the number of OB/GYN malpractice cases by the number 
of births in thousands.  For another measure of malpractice risk I use the amounts of 
OB/GYN claims paid after adjusting for inflation using the urban consumer price index 
for the year of the report in thousands of dollars and then dividing it by the number of 
births.57   
                                                 
54 I cover 81 percent of injuries in terms of frequency based on figure 5 with this window.  Figure 6 shows 
slightly lower coverage which is 76 percent in terms of severity by using a 6 year window.   
55 Only around one percent of cases based on the number of claims or 0.3 percent of cases based on the 
amount of payout are closed within the same year from the year injury happened.   
56 Results are robust even if I use a 5-year window instead of a 6-year window. 
57 The paid year, not reported year, should be used.  But paid year is not recorded in the data.  Considering 
the rule that all paid claims should be reported within 30 days after payout reported year is a good proxy. 
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It is likely that doctors will consider not only this year's risk but also risk in recent 
years.  To account for this, I will use a three-year moving average to measure the level of 
risk that doctors face.58  The choice of a three year moving average is subject to 
discussion.  Considering that the average litigation process takes three to four years, it is 
reasonable to assume that there is persistence in the malpractice risk from year to year.  
An additional benefit is that it will give a less noisy measure because the incidence rate is 











st RMAR  
To construct the malpractice risk for OB/GYN doctors in 1993, I use obstetric-
related cases in which an injury happened in 1993, and the case was reported by 1999.  
Then the frequency of these included cases is divided by the number of births (in 
thousands) in 1993.  The severity of these cases is measured in thousands of dollars 
divided by the number of births in 1993.  Measured risk for OB/GYN doctors as in 
equation (1) in 1993, 1992 and 1991 was averaged to get the final measure of risk in 
equation (2) that OB/GYN doctors face in 1993.  I have constructed malpractice risk in 
this way from 1992 to 1998.  I cannot include data for 1999 because the six-year window 
for injuries occurring in this year is past the date of my last observation.  The 
incorporation of the three-year moving average also forces me to drop the first two years 
of observations for which I have outcome data (injuries that happened in 1990 or 1991).   
Table 3-1 presents descriptive statistics for the malpractice risk that OB/GYN 
doctors face.  The first column contains the malpractice risk OB/GYNs face for the full 
sample, "all births", over 1992 - 1998.  In the second column I present malpractice risk 
                                                 
58 Results are robust to not using moving average for the risk measure. 
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for non-OB/GYN specialties which will be used as an instrumental variable.  The amount 
of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in $1,000s and the amount of non-OB/GYN per 
population in $1,000s are presented in 2002 dollars.  OB/GYNs face an average 
probability of a successful malpractice suit of 0.19 percent for every 1,000 deliveries.  
Based on the severity measure presented in the bottom of Table 3-1, OB/GYN doctors 
face an average risk of $73 in payout for each delivery.  The numbers in the second 
column indicate that all of the non-OB/GYN specialties face a lower level of malpractice 
risk.  They face 0.04 percent probability of a positive payout malpractice suit by 
frequency risk measure for every 1,000 procedures and 8 in 2002 dollars payout for each 
procedure.  
 
3.3.3 Definition of Outcomes 
The extensive data available in the Natality Detail File provide me with a number 
of outcomes that measure the practice patterns of physicians.  The most frequent outcome 
analyzed is the method of delivery: vaginal or cesarean.  There are different costs and 
benefits of each procedure.  Women who delivered a baby by cesarean section can have a 
higher risk of hemorrhage, blood clots, and bowel obstruction as well as infection 
because it is a major abdominal surgery.  They also have to be hospitalized longer and are 
more likely to be re-hospitalized subsequently.  Women with a vaginal delivery are more 
likely to experience minor issues like urinary incontinence.  However, a baby that is born 
vaginally is more likely to have a nerve injury (Maternity Center Association, 2004).   
The following series of arguments suggest that cesarean section rates are 
employed as defensive medicine.  Most obstetrical malpractice litigation is triggered by 
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injuries to babies such as brain damage.59  In both animal experimentation and 
epidemiological studies, it has been shown that total asphyxia in full-term infants leads to 
brain damage and in many cases to perinatal death (Sachs, 1989).60  There is a greater 
chance of asphyxia when the baby is delivered vaginally.  When an injury occurs and the 
baby is delivered vaginally, the plaintiff has a greater ability to allege a failure to perform 
a timely cesarean section or misinterpretation of the fetal heart rate tracing, or both, 
resulting in death or brain damage (of the baby) (Sachs, 1989).   
There is also some suggestive evidence that c-section rates in the U.S. are 
responsive to malpractice risk.  Cesarean section rates in the US (6 percent) were similar 
to that of Europe (England 5 percent, Hungary 6 percent) in the early 1970s.  The U.S. 
rate increased to 20 percent between 1981 and 1983 while rates in England increased to 
only 10 percent (Watson et al., 1987).  Some have suggested that one possible 
explanation for the divergence in c-section rates between the two countries is the 
difference in legal environments.  The U.S. legal system, often described as litigious, 
could be driving the difference in c-section growth rates compared with other countries.61   
The Natality Detail File includes information on prenatal care, including the 
number of doctor's office visits during the pregnancy and the use of diagnostic 
procedures such as ultrasound and amniocentesis.  The data also indicate if equipment or 
technology such as fetal monitoring, forceps, or vacuum extraction were used during 
labor.  Ultrasound is a commonly-used diagnostic procedure that allows the provider to 
                                                 
59 The primary allegation of obstetric claims is a neurologically impaired infant (34.3%) and still birth or 
neonatal death (15.3%) based on the 2003 ACOG survey.  
60 Asphyxia means a condition in which an extreme decrease in the concentration of oxygen in the body 
accompanied by an increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide leads to loss of consciousness or death 
(The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition).  Perinatal means the five 
months before and one month after birth. 
61 Litigious America, Newsweek International, July 30, 2001  
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observe the development of a fetus.  Amniocentesis is a procedure performed during the 
early stages of pregnancy to detect genetic or chromosomal disorders using sample fluid 
from the mother's womb.  Fetal monitoring is typically performed during delivery to 
check the baby’s heart rate.  Steel forceps or soft cup vacuum extractors can be used to 
assist vaginal delivery when it does not progress spontaneously or when the baby must be 
delivered immediately due to either fetal distress or maternal fatigue.   
Prenatal care visits are recorded as integer counts and values range from 0 to 49.  
All other outcomes are recorded as dummy variables where usage of the procedure, test, 
or device is given a value of 1.   
 
3.3.4 Subsamples 
I use a census of births in the U.S. from 1992-1998.  This is referred to as the "All 
Births" sample in the Tables in the text.  Some patients are more likely to be more 
affected by a physician's change in practice style stemming from an increase in 
malpractice risk.  I divide the data into six different subsamples that might be more or 
less susceptible to practice pattern changes based on the mother’s history of previous 
delivery, complications during birth, or socio-economic status.   
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and King and Lahiri 
(1994) claim that a c-section may represent defensive medicine for some patients and that 
this would be especially true for patients with a previous c-section.62  Within the medical 
profession, there is substantial disagreement on the costs and benefits of vaginal 
                                                 
62 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have targeted that by the year 2010 the U.S. cesarean 
delivery rate for women giving birth for the first time should decrease to 15 percent from the 1998 baseline 
rate of 18 percent (U.S. Public health service, 1991).  They specifically wanted to increase vaginal birth 
after cesarean rates to 37 percent from 28 percent (the 1998 rate) by the year 2010. 
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deliveries after c-sections (VBACs) and as a result, a consensus guideline for treatment 
has not yet been reached.  The old concept could be summarized by the phrase, "Once 
cesarean forever cesarean."  The supporting idea was that a woman who has a scar in her 
uterus as a result of a previous cesarean section might have a higher probability of 
experiencing a rupture in a future labor.  Repeated cesarean would then reduce the chance 
of separation of the uterus.  However, c-section carries its own risks, such as blood clots, 
bowel obstruction, or infection, since it is a major abdominal surgery.   
Due to the lack of consensus in the medical profession about the desirability of 
VBACs, and partly due to movements by such groups as the CDC and ACOG to lower 
the repeated cesarean section rate, VBAC rates have fluctuated significantly over time.  
Almost 19 percent of patients who had a previous c-section delivered their baby vaginally 
in 1989, but this rate increased sharply to 28.3 percent by 1996, and then declined rapidly 
to 20.6 percent by 2000.  A high risk of trying vaginal labor for patients with a previous 
c-section, and a lack of consensus in the medical profession, may lead obstetricians to 
respond to the malpractice risk that they face when they practice for this subgroup of 
patients.  This group is referred to as the "Previous cesarean section" sample in the tables 
and in the text.63   
There are specific high-risk medical conditions such as breech presentation for 
pregnancy.  Breech presentation means that a baby is in buttocks or feet-first position 
instead of a head first position.  For some breech presentations, vaginal delivery can pose 
serious health risks for both the mother and the baby (Sachs, 1989).  Other conditions that 
produce more frequent use of c-sections include gestational diabetes, multiple births and 
                                                 
63 Several studies found that Patients who tried VBAC but failed in the end have higher risks of uterine 
disruption and infectious morbidity compared with repeat cesarean delivery (Hibbard et al., 2001, Landon 
et al., 2004, Scott et al., 1998, Mozurkewich and Hutton, 2000).  
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high blood pressure.  These potentially high-risk patients could lead doctors to choose 
more defensive procedure choices.  People also have expressed concern that care for 
these high-risk pregnancies could be impacted by heightened professional liability risk.        
Low socio-economic status patients are another subgroup of women that 
researchers believe are differentially affected by physicians’ practice changes (Dubay et 
al., 1999).  Some state governments have experienced reduced obstetrician participation 
in Medicaid.64  One possible reason is the common notion that low-income patients are 
more litigious with physicians even though the data do not confirm this.65  These low 
socio-economic status patients also have lower incomes and a higher probabilities of 
adverse outcomes which might lead to litigation.  They have limited access to health care 
including prenatal care due to medical insurance status or time constraints.  Therefore, 
obstetricians might choose more defensive procedures or perform more diagnostic tests 
when they care for this subgroup.  In this chapter, I classify the low socio-economic 
status group as those with less than or equal to a high school degree.66  
In Table 3-2, I present descriptive statistics for a variety of outcomes on the full 
set of patients in the first column.  The "previous cesarean section" sample is presented in 
the second column.  In the third column, I present the subgroup that has not had a 
previous c-section at the time of delivery, which is the residual population from the 
second column.  I present the subsamples of patients with complications in columns 4, 5 
and 6: breech presentation, gestational diabetes and multiple births.  In the far right 
                                                 
64 For example, providers participating in Medicaid maternity care declined by 4.3 percent in 1986 
compared to the year before in Washington state.  
65 General Accounting Office (GAO), U.S. Congress. 1987. Medical Malpractice: Characteristics of Claims 
Closed in 1984. GAO/HRD-87-55 
66 I also tried the socio-economic classification which was used by Dubay et al.:  unmarried, less than high 




column I present births to mothers with a high school degree or less as the low socio-
economic subsample.  
Except for prenatal visits, the statistic presented is the percentage of patients 
receiving the given procedure.  Given the large sample size, standard deviations for these 
discrete outcomes are approximately equal to 5.0)]1([ XX −  where X  is the sample mean.   
The primary outcome in the analysis is the choice between c-section and vaginal delivery, 
and this outcome is given in the first row.  C-section rates vary considerably across 
subsamples as expected.  Only sixteen percent of pregnancies are delivered by c-section 
among the patients who had not had a previous c-section.  On the other hand, eighty-six 
percent of pregnancies are delivered by c-section in the case of breech presentation.  The 
number of prenatal visits could measure the mother’s access to health care.  Interestingly, 
the number of prenatal visits does not vary much across subsamples.  The use of 
diagnostic tests (ultrasound and amniocentesis) during pregnancy, and the use of 
equipment or technology like fetal monitoring, forceps and vacuum extraction during 
labor are my other outcome variables reported in rows three through seven.  Use of 
ultrasound and amniocentesis are significantly higher for women with complications.  
Patients with less than or equal to a high school degree have the lowest rates of use of 
diagnostic tests among all subsamples.  Note that since forceps and vacuum are assisting 








3.3.5 Econometric Model 
 
The basic question I examine is whether a higher malpractice risk faced by 
OB/GYNs alters procedure choices.  As discussed above, I measure risk (MAR) in two 
ways: (1) the number of OB/GYN claims per 1,000 births over the last three years in a 
state, and (2) the amount of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in $1,000s over the last three 
years in a state.  The basic econometric model is a within-group specification, in which I 
examine within-state changes in the use of procedures over time as malpractice risk 
changes.  This model can be described by the following specification:  
(3)    istst
OB
stistist MARXY ν+α+θ+λ+β=   
where istY  measures the procedure choice (e.g., the binary variable equals 1 if the baby 
was delivered by c-section and equals 0 for vaginal deliveries) for patient i in state s in 
year t; istX  denotes the mother's observable characteristics which include age, race and 
education; tθ  is a year fixed effect; sα  is a state fixed effect; and ν  is an idiosyncratic 
error.  In all models, I calculate variances allowing for arbitrary form of 
heteroskedasticity and allowing for arbitrary correlation in errors within a state.   
The use of a within-group specification is critical for a variety of reasons.  Much 
of the variation in malpractice risk is due to permanent differences across states.  If I 
regress the state-level malpractice risk on state and year fixed effects, I obtain R-squared 
values of 0.73 and 0.68 for the frequency risk measure and the severity risk measure, 
respectively.  This is not surprising.  Each state has a different tort law system, leading 
some states to have a more favorable legal climate for plaintiffs than others.   
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We could capture some of these permanent differences by including a series of 
descriptive variables that characterize a state’s tort law system.  However, these variables 
would imperfectly measure these differences, especially in the case of medical 
malpractice, since tort law is based on both common and statutory law.   
More importantly, I am concerned that the same factors that lead to a different 
legal environment may also reveal something about the medical environment.  For 
example, suppose a state has lower quality medical services with a higher than average 
frequency of true medical malpractice.  In this case, the medical tort system within a state 
may evolve reflecting the higher rate of malpractice.  The state legal environment may 
alter the burden of proof for plaintiffs, or payments conditional on judgment may differ 
as well.  To address these unobservable differences between states, I use a within-state 
model that uses variation over time in malpractice risk and procedure choices to identify 
the model.  Therefore, any difference in practice style or malpractice risk that is 
permanent across states will be purged from the analysis by adding state fixed effects.   
Even if I use a within-group model, malpractice risk may signal something 
unobserved about physician quality.  Suppose that low-ability doctors are more prone to 
use c-sections so as to minimize the possibility of an emergency situation such as fetal 
distress or dystocia, common complications of vaginal deliveries.  At the same time, low 
ability doctors are also more likely to be sued, since the quality of their service provided 
is substandard.  If this is the case, then there is a positive correlation between the 
malpractice risk and error term in (3), biasing upward the coefficientλ .  
Omitted variables bias might also be generated by reverse causality.  As I 
mentioned above, deliveries by c-sections are less likely to be sued than vaginal 
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deliveries.  If doctors shed risk by performing more c-sections, this may decrease the 
malpractice risk as I’ve constructed it.  If this is the case, then there is a negative 
correlation between the malpractice risk and error term in (3), biasing downwards the 
coefficientλ .   
To reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias, I will use an instrumental 
variable (IV) procedure.  A 2SLS model will produce a consistent estimate of λ  if I can 
identify an instrumental variable that alters the OB/GYN malpractice risk but does not 
directly impact c-section rates.  I will use a measure of malpractice risk for all other 
medical specialties except OB/GYN as an instrument.   
As I demonstrate below, it is easy to establish the first criteria, namely, that 
within-state malpractice risk is correlated across specialties. This instrument captures 
medical malpractice risk that is specific to each state and year observation that is not 
based on practice style.  Potential plaintiffs consider a number of factors when deciding 
whether or not they should seek a legal remedy for their injuries.  One factor they 
consider is the legal climate within the state.  The state tort laws or recent jury verdicts 
may encourage or discourage patients from seeking remedies regardless of medical 
specialty.  Subsequently, in any given year, the malpractice risk for OB/GYNs and non-
OB/GYNs in a state may be correlated since both risks are governed by the same legal 
climate.   
The other criterion to be a valid instrument is that the instrument must not directly 
impact the outcome of interest.  In other words, OB/GYNs should depend only on their 
own specialty's risk, not other specialties' risks for their procedure choices.  For example, 
when the number of malpractice claims in cardiology increases due to medical services 
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provided to their patients OB/GYN doctors will not change their procedure choice (e.g., 
c-section and vaginal delivery) based on increased malpractice risk in cardiology.  Each 
specialty has its own underlying malpractice risk which does not depend on other 
specialties partly because each specialty, especially OB/GYN, provides unique medical 
services.  Separate malpractice insurance premia by specialty reflects these factors.  
Therefore, changes in malpractice risk for non-OB/GYNs will not change the procedure 
choice of OB/GYNs unless it is subsumed in the legal environment.67   
In summary, the legal environment may be reflected in both OB/GYN and non-
OB/GYN malpractice risk.  However, it is unlikely that OB/GYNs are responding to the 
higher risk levels in non-OB/GYN specialties.  The higher risk that doctors face in all 
other specialties except OB/GYN should be subsumed into the OB/GYN risk through the 
legal environment.  Therefore, my assumption that malpractice risk in non-OB/GYN 
affects OB/GYN procedure choices only through the legal climate seems reasonable. 
I measure non-OB/GYN risk exactly the same way as OB/GYN risk with only 
one exception.  I use the number of births as a denominator to calculate risk per case for 
OB/GYNs, but for non-OB/GYN cases, I use the resident population of the state in the 
relevant year as the denominator.   
 
 
                                                 
67 The worst possible scenario for my instrument is that doctors' abilities in OB/GYN and non-OB/GYN in 
a state move together over time.  However, my instrument will be valid unless doctors in all specialties 
have the same preference in geography (e.g., one region experience lower ability doctors throughout all 
specialties) and it looks like doctors are more likely to change preference on specialty based on future 





3.4.1 The Impacts of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Cesarean Section 
In Table 3-3, I report OLS and two-stage-least-square (2SLS) estimates of 
equation (3) for one outcome variable, cesarean section, for the all births sample.  I only 
report the estimated coefficient on the malpractice variable as that is the coefficient of 
primary interest.  In the first panel, I present OLS estimates which are potentially biased 
for the reasons mentioned above.  I use two measures of risk: the number of OB/GYN 
claims per 1,000 births and the amount of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in thousands of 
dollars.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The negative sign of the coefficients 
for malpractice risk suggest that fewer cesarean sections are performed when risk 
increases, which is contrary to the conventional wisdom.  However, none of the 
coefficients are estimated precisely.  In addition, the elasticity for the number of 
OB/GYN claims per 1,000 births reported in square bracket is -0.0062, which is very 
small.  The elasticity for the amount of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in $1,000s is even 
smaller. 
The second panel of Table 3-3 presents the first stage results for the 2SLS 
estimates.  The coefficient estimates for both non-OB/GYN risk measures are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, meaning that the instrument and 
OB/GYN malpractice risk are correlated.  In the third panel, I report the 2SLS estimates 
for the malpractice risk measures.68  The coefficient of risk measured as the number of 
                                                 
68 Due to the large number of observations I cannot run the regression using each birth as the unit of 
observation.  I collapsed the data into cell’ based on the covariates which are all discrete (such as age, race, 
marital status, education, state and year) and use the cell size as a frequency.  Unfortunately, there is no 
STATA procedure that allows calculating clustered standard errors in a 2SLS model with fixed-effects and 
using frequency weights.  Therefore, I run the first stage, get the predicted value and use this predicted 
value in the second regression.  In this case I will not get the correct standard error because the actual 
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OB/GYN claims per 1,000 births decreases greatly compared to the OLS estimate.  
However, not surprisingly, the standard errors increase substantially.  As a result, the 
2SLS estimates are statistically insignificant.  For risk measured as the amount of 
OB/GYN claims paid per birth in $1,000s, the 2SLS estimate is much larger than the 
OLS estimate.  It is positive, which supports the hypothesis that c-sections increase with 
higher malpractice risk.  However, this estimate is also imprecise.  Based on the p value 
of the Hausman test for exogeneity reported at the bottom of Table 3-3, I cannot reject 
the null that the OLS estimates are statistically equal to the 2SLS estimates.  While the 
magnitude of the estimates changed substantially, the increased standard error makes it 
difficult to reject the null hypothesis.   
The elasticity calculated from the 2SLS results using the number of OB/GYN 
claims per 1,000 births or the amount of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in $1,000s are 
both still very small.  If the amount of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in $1,000s 
increased from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile (which is a 54 dollar increase in 
risk per delivery) the rate of cesarean sections would increase by just 0.1 percentage 
points, which is 0.6 percent of the mean.  In other words, it is the case that for every 
10,000 babies delivered, 2,278 babies are delivered by c-section.  A 129 percent increase 
in risk will increase the number of babies delivered by c-sections by 14.  Even if the true 
impact of the malpractice risk were at the top end of the 95 percent estimated confidence 
interval, an increase in the amount of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in $1,000s from the 
25th percentile to the 75th percentile would increase the c-section rate by only one 
                                                                                                                                                 
malpractice risk is required to calculate the correct 2SLS standard errors.  I am able to compare estimates 
from this procedure with estimates from a 2SLS model for breech presentation since it has only 940,378 
observations.  I do not need to use frequency weight and STATA provides for 2SLS without using 
frequency weight.  The standard errors differ from each other in the fifth digit after the decimal point.  So I 
am comfortable presenting standard error estimates based on this alternative procedure. 
 
 66
percentage point.  Therefore, although the estimates are statistically insignificant, we can 
reject the hypothesis that the impact of malpractice risk on c-section choice is substantial. 
In Table 3-4, I expand my analysis of cesarean sections into the six different 
subsamples discussed earlier.  In the first column, I repeat the all births sample that I 
presented in Table 3-3 as a reference.  The rest of the columns are classified into three 
categories: (1) based on pregnancy history of having had a previous c-section (candidates 
for VBAC in the 2nd column and the rest of sample in the 3rd column), (2) complications 
of pregnancy (breech presentation, gestational diabetes, and multiple births), and (3) low 
education (less than or equal to high school graduate) as socio-economic status.    
In the first panel, I report OLS estimates.  Standard errors that allow for 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary covariance in errors within a state are reported in 
parentheses and the elasticity is reported in square brackets.  The coefficients of interest 
are all negative except for the no previous c-section group in column 3 for both frequency 
(number of OB/GYN claims / 1,000 births) and severity (amount of OB/GYN claims paid 
/ birth in $1,000s) but statistically insignificant. The first-stage estimates for 2SLS in the 
second panel are statistically significant at the 1 percent level throughout all of the 
subsamples.  The 2SLS estimates reported in the third panel differed substantially from 
the OLS estimates.  Some of the 2SLS estimates such as all births using amount of 
OB/GYN claims paid/birth in $1,000s even changed sign from the corresponding OLS 
estimates but the direction of movement from OLS is not consistent throughout the  
subsamples.  However, all of the coefficients are estimated imprecisely and I cannot 
reject the null based on the p values of the Hausman test for exogeneity reported in the 
last panel.   
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Consider the magnitude of the estimate using the amount of OB/GYN claims paid 
per birth in $1,000s for less than or equal to high school degree.  If the malpractice risk 
were to increase from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile the cesarean section rate 
would increase by just 0.2 percentage points, which is 0.8 percent of the mean.  In other 
words, babies delivered by c-sections would increase by only 16 from 2,180 for every 
10,000 babies born to mothers with less than or equal to a high school degree as a result 
of a 129 percent increase in risk. 
 
3.4.2 The Impacts of Malpractice Risk on Other Outcomes 
In Table 3-5, I report OLS estimates for various outcomes using the number of 
OB/GYN claims per 1,000 births as the risk measure.  The number of prenatal visits as an 
outcome is presented in the second row.  Higher malpractice risk could limit patients’ 
access to healthcare if some doctors decided to stop practicing OB/GYN as malpractice 
risks increased.  On the other hand, doctors might want to see patients more often to 
decrease the possibility of litigation.  The estimated effect here is positive, which 
suggests that pregnant women see doctors more often when doctors face higher 
malpractice risk.  For pregnant women who have gestational diabetes, higher malpractice 
risk produces a statistically significant increase in prenatal visits.  In the next two rows, I 
report results for the ultrasound and amniocentesis outcomes.  Some doctors were sued 
due to failure to detect certain genetic problems in advance which can give parents 
broader choice.69  Therefore, doctors might want to perform diagnostic tests to detect any 
genetic problems more aggressively with increased malpractice risk.  Indeed, these 
estimates suggest that doctors are more likely to use these diagnostic tests with a higher 




malpractice risk.  For mothers who had a c-section previously and for mothers having 
multiple births, the coefficient on malpractice risk in the amniocentesis equation is 
estimated with statistical precision.  The coefficients on malpractice risk for both 
subsamples are 0.05 and 0.08, respectively.  I find a positive sign in all subgroups for use 
of vacuum except for the multiple births subgroup.  No statistically significant change 
however is detected. 
I next report 2SLS estimates in Table 3-6 for each subsample, using the number 
of OB/GYN claims per 1,000 births.  The p-value from the exogeneity test is in curly 
brackets.  For the use of amniocentesis, the 2SLS estimates are six times larger than the 
corresponding OLS estimates and these estimates indicate that amniocentesis rates 
increase as doctors face higher malpractice risk.  I reject the null of exogeneity meaning 
that the 2SLS estimates are significantly different from their OLS counterparts.  Looking 
at the multiple births sample, the elasticity of amniocentesis for this group is 1.3, which is 
very large.  Increasing the malpractice risk from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile 
would increase the rate of amniocentesis by 4.1 percentage points, which is 64.7 percent 
of the mean.  For every 10,000 multiple birth babies, 626 have an amniocentesis test and 
405 more babies would have amniocentesis when the risk increases 85 percent.  For the 
rest of the subgroups, the impact of malpractice risk on the use of amniocentesis is 
somewhat smaller.  There is one more statistically significant estimate for the gestational 
diabetes subsample.  Use of vacuum extraction will increase 1.3 percentage points when 
malpractice risk increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile. 
Table 3-7 presents OLS results for risk measured as the amount of OB/GYN 
claims paid per birth in $1,000s.  Use of amniocentesis is positive throughout all 
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subgroups and statistically significant for the previous cesarean section, gestational 
diabetes, multiple births and less than or equal to high school degree subgroups.  For the 
previous cesarean section subgroup, malpractice risk has a statistically significant 
positive impact on the use of amniocentesis, forceps and vacuum extraction.   
In Table 3-8, I report 2SLS results using the amount of OB/GYN claims 
paid/birth in $1,000s as the risk measure.  When the number of prenatal visits is the 
dependent variable, the coefficient is negative, which suggests there might be some 
problem with access to health care that changes the sign from OLS estimates.  However, 
all of the estimates are statistically insignificant with relatively small elasticities.   
Malpractice risk increases the use of amniocentesis by a statistically significantly 
amount in all subsamples except breech presentation.  For the previous cesarean section 
subsample, if the malpractice risk increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile 
the rates of amniocentesis increase by 3 percentage points, which is 54 percent of the 
mean.  For every 10,000 multiple births babies, 536 babies have the amniocentesis test as 
a baseline.  If malpractice risk were to increase by 77 percent, 290 more babies would 
have the amniocentesis test.  For the same subsample, forceps and vacuum extraction 
usage also would increase by a statistically significant amount, but the value is smaller in 
magnitude with elasticities of 0.6 and 0.4, respectively.   
3.4.3 Other Measures of Malpractice Risk 
There are some other ways to measure malpractice risk.  One is to use a different 
source of closed claims data that has some advantages over the NPDB.  The state of 
Texas collects data on closed malpractice cases within their jurisdictions and this data is 
publicly available to researchers.  Texas is the 2nd largest state measured by population 
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and the 3rd largest in total health care spending (Black et al., 2005).  The advantages of 
the Texas data are as follows.  The Texas data have county level information as well as 
the month and year of injury, filing of the suit and payment.  The Texas data also have a 
unique identifier that allows me to combine multiple defendant cases into a single case.  
It also includes the payment of cases on behalf of hospitals.   
I have analyzed the Texas closed claims data collected from 1988 to the present 
using a within-county model.  In this analysis, I found that malpractice risk has no 
statistically significant impact on procedure choices.  I also find an insignificant first 
stage at the 5 percent level using an instrumental variable constructed in the same way as 
in this chapter.  It might be because the judicial area does not completely match with the 
county or, as we see in the malpractice insurance market, it has a different market area 
from the county border. In any case, the model does not have a sufficiently large sample 
size to be successfully identified.   
The other possible source of a malpractice risk measure is to use malpractice 
premiums, which have been used in several previous studies.  The Medical Liability 
Monitor surveys malpractice insurance premiums annually at the state level or, in some 
cases, at the sub-state level.70  With these data, I used the log of the average annual 
premium for OB/GYNs from 1994 to 2002 as a measure of the malpractice risk that 
OB/GYNs face.  I then used the log of premiums for general surgeons as an instrumental 
variable.  The estimates from the first stage of the 2SLS estimates were significant at the 
1 percent level, but the 2SLS estimates were insignificant for most outcomes, including 
                                                 
70 Respondents report the base premium for coverage providing $1 million per claim and $3 million in 
aggregate for a year, which is considered standard coverage.  Survey respondents report premiums for three 




c-section rates.  As other research has found, my results show very little correlation 
between premiums and either frequency or severity of malpractice claims.   
 
3.4.4 Marginal Patient Sample 
When OB/GYNs choose the delivery method between a c-section and a vaginal 
delivery, they consider various medical and physical conditions.  Therefore, not all 
women are equally likely to have a c-section.  Some conditions, such as breech 
presentation, increase the chance of a c-section greatly.  When the patient's medical 
condition makes the choice obvious, malpractice risk is less likely to affect a doctor’s 
behavior.  However, for some patients where the method of delivery is not as certain 
based on observed characteristics, malpractice risk could be a larger factor in the doctor’s 
decision.  For example, a patient with certain conditions might be treated using a c-
section by some doctors and using vaginal delivery by others. 
In this section, I develop a model that attempts to telescope in on those patients 
who are most likely to be affected by malpractice risk.  I will call this sample “the 
marginal patient sample” because it excludes patients with the lowest and highest 
probabilities of having a c-section.  To find the marginal patient sample, I regressed 
medical and physical information on a dummy variable that equals one if a cesarean 
section was preformed, with state and year fixed effects.  The model fits quite well – the 
R2 for this regression is 0.17.  Next I rank patients by their predicted probability of 
having a cesarean section by descending order.  Patients who fall between the 12.5th 
percentile and the 37.5th percentile of the descending order of predicted c-section 
probability are the marginal patient sample considering the roughly 23 percent c-section 
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delivery rate for all births in my data.  The marginal patient sample has 5.8 million 
observations. 
Table 3-9 displays descriptive statistics on the two measures of risk for this 
marginal patient sample. It is very similar to that of previous subgroups reported in Table 
3-1.  In Table 3-10, the impact of malpractice risk on cesarean section for the marginal 
patient sample is reported.  In the first panel I present estimates from OLS specifications.  
For both measures of risk I find negative and insignificant estimates with very small 
elasticities.  The first stage of the 2SLS regression is significant as reported in the second 
panel.  2SLS estimates reported in the third panel are still negative and insignificant.  
Even if the true impact of the malpractice risk were at the top end of the 95 percent 
estimated confidence interval, an increase in the number of OB/GYN claims per 1,000 
births from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile would increase c-section rates by only 
0.6 percentage points.  When I use the amount of OB/GYN claims paid per birth in 
$1,000s the malpractice risk at the top end of the 95 percent estimated confidence interval 
would increase c-section rates by 1.6 percentage points, which is small.  In the last panel, 
I report the p-value from an exogeneity test and I cannot reject the null that OLS 
estimates are equal to the 2SLS estimates. 
3.5 Conclusion 
During the past year, President Bush has argued for ‘common-sense’ medical 
liability reform to protect patients, to stop sky-rocketing costs associated with frivolous 
lawsuits, to make health care more affordable and accessible for all Americans, and to 
keep necessary services in communities that need them most.71  A frequent justification 




for tort reform is the concern that malpractice risk may encourage doctors to alter their 
practice style.  To date, there is little evidence supporting this point.  In this chapter, I 
examined whether a higher risk of malpractice awards alters procedure choice in 
obstetrics.  I focused on the obstetric specialty because it is exposed to one of the highest 
malpractice risks in medicine and it is often considered to be a specialty in which 
defensive medicine is particularly prevalent.  
In a sample spanning 7 years and containing more than 24 million observations, I 
find that doctors' procedure choice is insensitive to the risk that they face.  I also find that 
increased malpractice risk has little if any impact on health care access, as measured by 
the number of prenatal doctor’s office visits.  I also find no statistically significant change 
in other measures of treatment such as ultrasound, forceps, and vacuum as malpractice 
risk changes.  Even though I find some significant increase in the use of amniocentesis 
when malpractice risk increases, overall I do not find substantial changes in behavior by 
obstetricians as malpractice risk increases. 
There are some limitations of this chapter in terms of data.  One is that the NPDB 
data is not complete because it does not cover payouts on behalf of hospitals (Smarr, 
1997).  It also did not include cases that ended without any positive payment.  However, 
the NPDB data is the most extensive existing data set and the results are not different 
even if I use a state of Texas data set, which has some advantages such as including 
claims against hospitals.   
Another limitation is that there is more than one possible explanation for my 
findings.  For example, there may be no significant principal agent concerns that lead to 
defensive medicine because doctors only care about the patients' outcomes.  The other 
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possibility is that malpractice risk is still too small for doctors to change procedure 
choices.  In addition, the measure of risk that I construct is still only a proxy for 
malpractice risk even though it is the best one given the available data.  Therefore, it 
might not capture perfectly the risk as it is perceived by physicians.  Unfortunately, this 
chapter cannot distinguish between these explanations and thus further research is 
needed. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, many states enacted tort reform in order to control 
malpractice insurance premiums.  However, the issue of malpractice premiums has 
recently returned as an object of public concern.  One of the most important reasons for 
further reform at the federal level is the potential adverse impact of increasing 
malpractice premiums on health care delivery through changes in doctors' behavior.  
Based on my findings, it appears that federal level tort reform will have at most a 




Chapter 4: Concluding Remark 
Legislation can be an effective way to overcome market failure and the health 
care market has been subject to frequent regulatory changes at the federal, state and local 
level.   In the two cases I’ve considered in this dissertation, I examine the evidentiary 
backing for two important pieces of health care quality legislation.  The first was a 
California state law requiring minimum nurse/patient staffing levels in hospitals.  The 
second is federal tort reform.  In both cases, there was limited evidence justifying 
legislative intervention.   Using the techniques used by economists, I evaluate these 
claims using large representative samples of data and in both cases, I find the evidence 
lacking.   
Some researchers have documented a correlation between nurse to patient ratio 
and patient outcomes.  As I argue above, however, there is reason to believe these results 
represent correlation and not a causal relationship.  In this dissertation, I attempt to add to 
the literature by estimating the impact of hospital staff levels on adverse events by 
examining whether outcomes are correlated with the number of admissions in the hospital 
over the next two days.  The variation I exploit to identify the models is exactly the type 
of variation the California law is designed to eliminate.  Specifically, the law requires 
minimum staff levels at all points in time.  I find quantitatively small and statistically 
insignificant effects of Friday and Saturday admission shocks on mortality rates of 
patients admitted on Thursdays.   These results suggest that the portion of the California 
law designed to guarantee adequate staffing when the patient census increases 
unexpectedly should have little impact on patient outcomes.  However, there are some 
important limitations to this study.  For example, the California nurse staffing law will 
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increase the size of hospital staffs.  This change can potentially raise overall care quality 
by providing patients with a more attentive staff.  It can however decrease quality if the 
new nurses hired because of the legislation are of lower quality that existing employees.  
Another re-occurring legislative issue in the health care market is tort reform.  
Policy makes argue that high malpractice risks encourage doctors to practicing defensive 
medicine.  However, the evidence establishing this claim is, at best, limited.  In the third 
chapter of my dissertation I examine whether malpractice risk alters the procedure 
choices of obstetricians.  I focus on obstetricians because they face one of the highest 
rates of malpractice lawsuits and pay much larger malpractice premiums than most other 
specialties.  The high rate of c-sections in this country is also frequently cited as an 
example of defensive medicine.  Because the measured malpractice risk may signal 
something unobserved about physician quality or practice style, I use malpractice claims 
against non-OB/GYNs as an instrument for OB/GYN claims.  Finally, my sample has 
over 23 million observations.  Although I focus on a specialty with a high malpractice 
risk, examining a procedure that is thought to be sensitive to malpractice risk, and using 
the largest sample ever to examine this question, I find there is little evidence that 
malpractice risk alters procedure choice of doctors.   
As with Chapter 3, there are some limitations to this work.  My instrument was 
constructed from the same data that I construct malpractice risk for OB/GYN claims.  If 
there is measurement error in the endogenous variable, the instrumental variable will face 
exactly the same problem.  One limitation of the work is that I cannot explain why the 
cesarean section rate is not sensitive to medical malpractice risk.  I have a few 
conjectures.  If doctors are only concern about their patients then there will not be any 
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defensive medicine.  If malpractice risk that doctors perceive is different from my 
measure of malpractice risk then I will not find any changes of procedure choice based on 
my measure of malpractice risk.  For example, doctors are not only concern their own 
state’s precedents but neighbor state’s precedents.  Malpractice risk is a perceived risk 
which can’t be measured perfectly in any way.  What I tried in this dissertation is to 
measure malpractice risk as objectively as possible and my objective measure is one 




Table 2-1. Hospital Workers and Admitted Patients by the Day of the Week 




Percent of people that reported working on a particular day 
from the 






Registered nurses in 
hospitals 
  
Nurse aides or orderlies 




Percent of admissions to 
California hospitals by the 


















Sunday 41.9 14.8 42.9  8.9  9.2 9.3 
Monday 81.2 85.1 81.7 89.9  17.4 17.2 
Tuesday 82.1 82.8 82.4 93.7  17.1 17.0 
Wednesday 79.8 83.1 82.5 93.7  16.4 16.3 
Thursday 76.9 82.9 78.0 92.5  15.6 15.6 
Friday 71.0 80.5 73.4 91.2  14.9 14.8 
Saturday 38.4 15.5 40.3 14.9  9.5 9.7 
 
a The May 1997 and 2001 CPS Work Schedule Supplements asked the following questions. In 1997: Which 
days of the week do you work?  Check all that apply.  In 2001: Which days of the week do you usually 
work? Check all that apply. 
 
b Based on a adult medical and surgical admissions of the California hospital discharge data(1996-2000) 

































Sunday 1.0082 0.2768 0.6990 0.8571 1.1428 1.3114 1.8761 
Monday 1.0073 0.2779 0.7046 0.8587 1.1386 1.3114 1.8611 
Tuesday 1.0079 0.2880 0.6871 0.8520 1.1428 1.3251 1.9285 
Wednesday 1.0079 0.2952 0.6797 0.8458 1.1497 1.3333 1.9616 
Thursday 1.0087 0.3234 0.6575 0.8315 1.1626 1.3675 2.0798 
Friday 1.0070 0.3834 0.6050 0.8000 1.1818 1.4222 2.3507 
Saturday 1.0099 0.3207 0.6518 0.8358 1.1636 1.3584 2.0840 
Based on adult medical and surgical admissions of the California hospital discharge data (1996-2000) that 
we use below. 
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We present standard deviations for continuous variables and these numbers are in parenthesis. Give our 
large sample sizes, standard deviations for discrete outcomes are approximately equal to [x-(1-x-)]0.5 where x- 
is the sample mean. 
a These diseases are selected only from the 100 diseases with the highest mortality counts. 





Table 2-4.  Descriptive Statistics, Moving Average and Regression-Based Friday/Saturday 





















































































































Table 2-5.  Impact of Friday/Saturday Hospital Admissions on Outcomes of Patients Admitted on 
Thursdays, 100 Diseases with the Highest Mortality Counts Sample,  Using the Friday/Saturday  
Moving Average Admission Index 
























































































































































































































Standard errors in parentheses.  
a Patients who died during their hospitalization were dropped from this sample.      
The independent variables include a complete set of hospital fixed-effects, month effects that vary by 
hospital size and region, a complete set of four-digit ICD-9CM effects and age effects, plus effects for sex, 
race and ethnicity (white, black, Hispanic and other), Federal holidays, insurance type (Medicare, 




Table 2-6.  Impact of Friday/Saturday Hospital Admissions on Outcomes of Patients Admitted on 






































100 diseases with the highest mortality counts sample, 












































50 diseases with the highest mortality counts sample, 












































50 diseases with the highest mortality rate sample, 












































Failure to rescue sample, 











































 Standard errors in parentheses. 
a Patients who died during their hospitalization were dropped from this sample.          
See footnotes to Table 2-5 for a list of other covariates in the regression.         
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Thursday admissions sample, using Friday/Saturday Moving Average Admission Index, 











































Thursday admissions sample, using Friday Moving Average Admission Index, 











































Thursday admissions sample, using Friday/Saturday/Sunday Moving Average Admission Index, 











































Friday admissions model, using Saturday Moving Average Admission Index, 










































Standard errors in parentheses. 
a Patients who died during their hospitalization were dropped from this sample.                      
See footnotes to Table 2-5 for a list of other covariates in the regression.  
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Table 2-8.  Impact of Friday/Saturday Hospital Admissions on Outcomes of Patients Admitted on 









































100 diseases with the highest mortality counts sample,  














































50 diseases with the highest mortality counts sample,   














































50 diseases with the highest mortality rate sample, 














































 Failure to rescue sample,  











































Standard errors in parentheses. 
a Patients who died during their hospitalization were dropped from this sample.   
See footnotes to Table 2-5 for a list of other covariates in the regression.  
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Table 2-9.  Impact of the Next Two Days Hospital Admissions on Outcomes of Patients, Various 
Samples, Using the Two-Day Moving Average Admission Index 
 
 
           Standard errors in parenthesis. 
         a Patients who died during their hospitalization were dropped from this sample.  
         b Diseases with less than 100 admissions and diseases with no mortality at all over the five years 
were dropped.  
See footnotes to Table 2-5 for a list of other covariates in the regression.   In these models, we also 









































100 diseases with the highest mortality counts sample, all days, using the  
next two days Moving Average Admission Index, 












































All admissions excluding rare diseases and diseases with no in-hospital mortalityb using the next two 
days Moving Average Admission Index, 






















































Number of  
OB/GYN 
Claims/1000births 




























































































































































































































































































































































I present standard deviations for continuous variables and these numbers are in parenthesis. All outcomes 
except prenatal visits are presented by percentage.  Prenatal visits recorded the number of visits to doctor=s 
office from 0 to 49.   
Give our large sample sizes,  standard deviations for discrete outcomes are approximately equal to [x-(1-x-)]0.5 
where x- is the sample mean. 











OLS Estimates  
Dependent variable: Cesarean Section 
 







Amount of OB/GYN Claims Paid 






First Stage Estimates 
 






Amount of non-OB/GYN Claims 





2SLS Estimates  
Dependent variable: Cesarean Section 
 







Amount of OB/GYN Claims Paid 






Exogeneity Test (P value) 
 





Amount of OB/GYN Claims Paid 







Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by state.   Elasticities are in brackets.  
State, year fixed effects are included.  
The independent variables for regression are age, race(White, Black, Hispanic and other), marital 
status(1 if married), and education(less than high school, high school graduate, some university, 
























































OLS Estimates,  Dependent variable: Cesarean Section 
 

































Amount of OB/GYN 



































First Stage Estimates 
 



























































2SLS Estimates,  Dependent variable: Cesarean Section 
 

































Amount of OB/GYN 



































Exogeneity Test (P value) 
 



















Amount of OB/GYN 









































Table 3-5.  Impact of Malpractice Risk on Various Outcomes, Various Samples, Using the 





































































































































































































































































































         * Cesarean population was dropped for this dependent variable analysis since this procedure 
is not used in case of cesarean section 






Table 3-6.  Impact of Malpractice Risk on Various Outcomes, Various Samples, Using the 














































































































































































































































































































































































* Cesarean population was dropped for this dependent variable analysis since this procedure is not used in 
case of cesarean section 





Table 3-7.  Impact of Malpractice Risk on Various Outcomes, Various Samples, Using the 





























































































































































































































































































































* Cesarean population was dropped for this dependent variable analysis since this procedure is not used in 
case of cesarean section 
See foot note for Table 3-3.   
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Table 3-8.  Impact of Malpractice Risk on Various Outcomes, Various Samples, Using the 















































































































































































































































































































































































* Cesarean population was dropped for this dependent variable analysis since this procedure is not used in 
case of cesarean section 












Number of OB/GYN 
Claims/1000births 
 
Amount of OB/GYN Claims 































































OLS Estimates  
Dependent variable: Cesarean Section 
 







Amount of OB/GYN Claims 






First Stage Estimates 
 






Amount of non-OB/GYN Claims 





2SLS Estimates  
Dependent variable: Cesarean Section 
 







Amount of OB/GYN Claims 






Exogeneity Test (P value) 
 





Amount of OB/GYN Claims 








Predicted cesarean section rate is calculated for each individual using 32 pregnancy related conditions 
such as blood pressure etc.  I rank each individual based on predicted cesarean section rate by 
descending order.  I use sub sample of 12.5th percentile to 37.5th percentile taking into account that c-
section rate of around 23 percent for all births as a marginal patients whose procedure choice are more 
responsive when malpractice risks for doctors are changed. 






Figure 3-1:  
 
Figure 3-2:  
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Figure 3-3:  
Cumulative Density Function 
of the Number of Malpractice Claims












Figure 3-4:  
Cumulative Density Function 
of the Amount of Claims Paid
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